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Upward Mobility and Authoritarian Stability: Merit-Based Elite Recruitment in China
Hanzhang Liu
Why does merit-based elite recruitment exist under authoritarianism, notwithstanding
its adverse impact on elites’ private interests? In my dissertation, I develop an argument
that centers on the role of upward mobility in authoritarian regime dynamics. I argue that
merit-based elite recruitment provides individuals from non-elite background an opportunity
to move into the ruling class by effort; it enhances their perception of upward mobility and
thus reduces their discontent with the status quo. An authoritarian ruler, therefore, may
deliberately adopt and institutionalize meritocracy in elite recruitment to engineer limited
but sustained upward mobility, which co-opts large numbers of non-elites and helps stabilize
the regime.
Focusing on the case of China and its national civil service examination (NCSE), I draw
on qualitative, quantitative, and experimental evidence to triangulate the complex dynamic
between the CCP leadership, local officials, and ordinary citizens in merit-based elite re-
cruitment. I employ two survey experiments to demonstrate that, by imposing institutional
constraints on local officials, the CCP leadership can make its commitment to merit-based re-
cruitment credible and enforceable. Analyzing data from two national representative surveys,
I find that the institutionalization of NCSE forges a widespread and persistent perception
of upward mobility among citizens eligible for the exam and weakens their pressure on the
regime for income redistribution; it also strengthens public support for local government and
contributes to the legitimacy of the CCP regime. These findings contribute to our under-
standing of the effects of meritocracy under authoritarianism and highlight the importance
of upward mobility in relation to regime resilience.
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“At any moment a servant may become a master, and he aspires to rise to that
condition; the servant is therefore not a different man from the master... [p]ublic
opinion, founded upon the usual order of things, draws them to a common level
and creates a species of imaginary equality between them, in spite of the real
inequality of their conditions.”1
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
Zhao Qian was a college graduate who studied law in a second-tier university in Sichuan
Province in China. Coming from a humble family in another province, she faced a tough
career prospect upon graduation despite her academic credential and the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) membership. As luck would have it, the provincial government of Sichuan
adopted a system of open exam to recruit new civil servants that year. Qian took advantage
of the opportunity and placed first in both the written test and the interview. She was subse-
quently offered a position in the provincial Department of Justice and became a government
official. Without the exam, she told a reporter, working in the government would have been
1Italicization emphasis added by author.
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“something beyond my wildest imagination.”2
Qian is among the tens of millions of college-educated youths in China today who apply
and compete for government jobs based on their effort and merit. The National Civil Service
Examination (NCSE), introduced in the late 1990s, has standardized and institutionalized
entry-level elite recruitment in China. It provides an open platform for citizens to compete
for government positions based on their ability and skills; family background and personal
ties to the regime alone no longer have decisive influence on recruitment.
Why does merit-based elite recruitment exist under authoritarianism? This is the central
question my dissertation seeks to answer. I argue that it serves a vital political function
of providing regular, albeit limited, opportunities for ordinary citizens to join the ruling
class. As a result, it cultivates among them what Tocqueville calls “imaginary equality”
(1835, Book III Chapter 5), despite entrenched elite privileges and inequality in the regime.
Upward mobility, which is well-known for its effect of “stabilization of the democratic order”
(Lipset 1992), plays a similar role in authoritarian political order. Its stabilizing effect can be
garnered with an institution of merit-based elite recruitment to strengthen regime survival.
1. Upward Mobility and Authoritarian Regime Dynamic
How do authoritarian regimes maintain survival? Most existing studies on regime dynamics
focus on the inherent tension between the ruling elites and the masses that stems primarily
from the socioeconomic disparity (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2005; Boix 2003).
They argue that this tension can be managed by redistributing some of the income from
the elites to the masses, as improvement of socioeconomic wellbeing for the masses helps
reduce their discontent and hostility towards the elites. Economic redistribution, along with
repression, therefore, is a mainstay in autocrats’ toolbox to control the masses and thereby
stabilize the regime (Wintrobe 1998).
2Southern Weekly. August 28, 2003. “The Ten-Year Journey of the Chinese Civil Service” (zhongguo
gongwuyuan shinian fengyu lu).
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While these studies provide valuable insights to the question of authoritarian survival, the
general framework seems to be largely predicated on an implicit but important assumption:
that there is little to no individual mobility between the elites and the masses. More often
than not, these two groups are treated as distinct without permeability between them; an
individual’s membership to either group is assumed to be fixed, which determines his socioe-
conomic status and, in turn, preference for redistribution. In other words, an individual’s
attitude towards the regime is solely a function of his class membership that is not expected
to change. Under this framework, redistribution from the elites to the masses is necessary
to buy off (at least some members of) the masses to maintain regime stability.
In reality, as an authoritarian regime persists over time, the elites inevitably face the
issue of class renewal and succession. This issue is particularly relevant for the more in-
stitutionalized regimes where the dictator has a longer time horizon and takes an interest
in economic development, i.e., a “stationary bandit” (Olson 1993). While elites in these
regimes do concern themselves with preserving privileges and reaping personal gains, they
also pay attention to effective governance. Consequently, when recruiting new members into
the ruling class, elites value not only candidates’ personal ties and loyalty to the regime, but
also their skills and ability necessary for governing.
Assuming that the distribution of talent is uniform across the population, merit-based
selection would allow some members of the masses to be recruited into the elite class. As
a result, there is a certain degree of upward mobility; i.e., it is possible for an individual to
move up from one class to the other in an authoritarian regime.
This upward mobility, defined as movement of individuals from the masses into the elite
class, has profound political implications for an authoritarian regime. Not only does it
co-opt a few with elite privileges and benefits, it shapes the belief held by the rest of the
masses regarding their future prospect. Since individual preference for redistribution is not
only determined by current socioeconomic conditions but also influenced by other factors
3
including culture, value, and belief (e.g., Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001; Iversen and
Soskice 2001), the upward mobility generated by elite recruitment can alter at least some
people’s demand for redistribution, hence having an impact on regime stability.
In the economics literature, it is argued that a higher degree of upward mobility has a
dampening effect people’s preference for redistribution. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973)
propose a theory of “tunnel effect”, where a poor individual draws gratification from the
advance made by other members of his class and becomes more optimistic about his own
future. Piketty (1995) attributes the persistent difference in individuals’ distributive prefer-
ence to their past experience with mobility. More recently, Benabou and Ok (2001) propose
a hypothesis of “prospect of upward mobility (POUM)”, where distributive preference is
formed partly based on expected future income; if an individual expects to earn a higher
income in the future, he would prefer less redistribution even at the present. Empirical
evidence shows when people believe that they can improve their socioeconomic conditions
by individual effort, they are less in favor of redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005;
Alesina and Angeletos 2005).
A sustained degree of upward mobility, therefore, can be used by the dictator to moderate
popular pressure for redistribution, which, if unmet, could lead to mass revolt. By allowing
a small number of ordinary citizens to join the elite class based on merit, the dictator not
only attracts talents to boost state capacity, but – more importantly – cultivates a belief
among the masses that they have a chance to become elites themselves. Once a perception
of upward mobility is formed, the dictator faces a reduced level of revolutionary threat, even
without expanding redistribution.
The focus of my dissertation is upward mobility under authoritarianism, which has been
largely missing from the analysis of regime dynamic. Using the case of contemporary China,
I argue that the dictator can harness upward mobility to his advantage and use it as an
instrument to achieve regime survival.
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2. Theory: Institutionalized Meritocracy
In an authoritarian regime without upward mobility, the only way for members of the masses
to improve socioeconomic conditions is by collective action, either in the form of collective
bargaining to obtain a larger income transfer or in the form of revolution to overthrow the
regime. In contrast, when there exists some upward mobility, individuals have an alterna-
tive: they can pursue individual advancement with their own effort rather than counting
on collective action, the success of which can be uncertain. By regularly recruiting a small
number of ordinary citizens into the elite class based on merit, therefore, the dictator can
effectively weaken the appeal of collective action and stabilize the regime without expanding
redistribution.
For this arrangement to work, however, the dictator must address two issues. The first is
a problem of credible commitment: the masses’ belief that they have an opportunity to work
their way up is conditioned upon the promise of sustained upward mobility, but how can
they be sure that the unconstrained dictator will not renege on this promise at any time?
The second, which can further compound the first, is a principal-agent problem, when the
dictator delegates the task of recruitment to his subordinates in the elite class, who have
divergent preference from the dictator and are prone to using recruitment as patronage. If
recruitment cannot reliably select candidates based on merit, it will not be viewed by the
masses as a viable channel of upward mobility.
I argue that, through institutionalization, the dictator can resolve these problems. By
setting up a set of clear, enforceable rules that bind himself and the elites, the dictator can
create an equilibrium where merit-based upward mobility is sustained.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The three (groups of) actors – the dictator,
the elites in the ruling coalition, and the masses – are represented in three boxes. Under
the name of each, in the parentheses, are the parameters of his utility function: the dictator
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Figure 1.1: Summary: Institutionalizing Merit-Based Elite Recruitment
is solely interested in regime survival (which encompasses both material gains and power
itself); the elites are interested in regime survival (from which they derive material gains) as
well as personal gains from rent-seeking; and the masses evaluate their utility based on both
current income and expected future income.
Non-Institutionalized Merit-Based Elite Recruitment
The dashed lines in the diagram represent the dynamic and interactions between actors
when merit-based recruitment is not institutionalized. The dictator suffers from a principal-
agent problem when delegating recruitment to the elites, who prefer to use recruitment as
patronage (i.e., handing out government jobs for personal gain). As a result, the dictator is
not able to maintain merit-based upward mobility, and the public does not expect to earn a
higher future income or change their preference for redistribution.
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Institutionalized Merit-Based Elite Recruitment
The solid lines in the diagram represent the dynamic and interactions between actors when
merit-based recruitment is institutionalized. This can be achieved by setting up a set of
clear, enforceable rules that constrain both the elites and the dictator.
The primary function of the rules is to eliminate or reduce patronage-based recruitment
by elites. To do so, the dictator introduces institutional features that prevent undesirable
information flow between elites and candidates, so that the elites in charge of recruitment
cannot identify candidates who are suited for patron-client relationships. Also, by making
the merit-based rules public, the dictator invites the masses to monitor the recruitment
process; elites who still engage in patronage-based recruitment, once detected and reported
by the public, face punishment from the dictator.
Once merit-based recruitment can be reliably enforced, it helps forge a public perception
of upward mobility, which reduces their demand for redistribution. While these outcomes
have a stabilizing effect on the regime, they also imply that, if the upward mobility is
suddenly abolished, it would drastically change individuals’ expectation of future income
and could trigger large-scale revolt.3 This revolutionary threat deters the dictator from
tampering with merit-based elite recruitment, hence credibly committing him to upholding
the system. Through institutionalization, all three actors are better off playing by the rules
of merit-based recruitment, thereby making it an equilibrium.
Theory Summary
To summarize, my core argument is as follows. By committing to a set of clear, enforce-
able rules that reduce patronage practice by elites, the dictator is able to institutionalize
3Indeed, this is exactly what happened when the the imperial court of China in the Qing Dynasty
abolished the imperial examination (keju) in 1905, which had served for centuries as a gateway for commoners
to leapfrog into the ruling gentry class. The sudden change in future prospect for the hopeful candidates
prompted a large number of them to join rebellion, which culminated in the 1911 Revolution that overthrew
the regime (Bai and Jia 2016).
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merit-based elite recruitment, which forges a widespread and persistent perception of up-
ward mobility among ordinary citizens and thereby dampens their redistribution preference.
The enhanced prospect of upward mobility and reduced pressure for redistribution thus help
stabilize the authoritarian regime.
Of course, the institution of merit-based elite recruitment largely benefits those with
merits ; individuals who have little education or skills would not see their upward mobility
change much. This scope condition, however, should not diminish the argument. In many
ways, educated non-elites exhibit greater “destabilizing behavior” if they are “unemployed,
alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied” (Huntington 1968, 68); it is imperative, therefore, that
the regime co-opt them to avoid potential opposition.
In the next section, I briefly describe the case of China, where the National Civil Service
Examination (NCSE), an institution of merit-based elite recruitment, was introduced two
decades ago. I argue that this institution has significantly enhanced many people’s upward
mobility prospect– even if they do not realize it eventually – and made them more tolerant
of the current regime even in the face of entrenched elite privileges and growing inequality.
3. Civil Service Reform
The Chinese Case
The authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in modern China bears
many hallmarks of authoritarianism. The ruling party is almost single-mindedly focused
on maintaining – and continuing to amass – its political power, and it manages its tenuous
relationship with the masses with a mix of strategies ranging from outright repression to
subtle co-optation. One thing that sets the CCP regime apart from other authoritarian
regimes, however, is the organizational prowess of the ruling party, which in turn manifests
itself as a high degree of state capacity. Throughout the different periods of the CCP rule,
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although its central task has not always remained the same (i.e., from making revolutions
to economic development), the party has always, till this day, placed paramount importance
on elite management. The guiding principle for CCP personnel management, “The party
manages cadres,”4 combined with the Stalinist slogan, “cadres decide everything,” reflects
the reality that, for CCP, elite management is the key to achieving any of its goals.
One important aspect of elite management is elite recruitment. What type(s) of in-
dividuals are recruited into the ruling elite class has direct consequences for government
performance. Prior to the personnel reform in the 1980s, elite recruitment in China used to
be done via a system called “job placement,” where the party unilaterally identified indi-
viduals who were deemed qualified – often based on recommendations made by universities
and work units or through personal connections – and recruited them based on internal
evaluation. As efficient and effective as it might have been, the job assignment system did
not allow an open labor market for individuals to freely apply or compete for government
positions. Most individuals, qualified or not, were shut out from the political elite class as
they never had a chance to be considered in the first place. As a result, even though the
recruitment system did select individuals from humble background and allowed them to rise
socioeconomically, most Chinese citizens did not perceive there to be much upward mobility
vis-a`-vis the political elite class.
The situation started to change with the personnel reform in the 1980s, the main goal of
which was to replace old revolutionary cadres with younger cadres with technical expertise.
In particular, elite recruitment underwent a transformation in the 1990s, as the central
government introduced the National Civil Service Examination (NCSE) as the standardized
and mandatory recruitment method for all entry-level civil servants.5 Under the new system,
4This is a literal translation of “dang guan ganbu”, which means that the Party is directly in charge of
cadre management.
5The term “civil servant” entered the Chinese political nomenclature in the late 1980s as a synonym for
“cadre,” but with a connotation of professionalism. It refers to a subset of government employees who form
the political elite class. A more detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 2.
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all college-educated citizens between the age of 18 and 35 are eligible to take the exam, and
all entry-level positions in government must be filled with the new recruitment method.
From the outset, the central government laid out the guiding principles for NCSE, which
were “open, fair, competitive, and meritocratic.”
Following the introduction of NCSE, the central government has since enacted the Civil
Service Law and a series of supporting legal documents to govern its implementation. Since
local elites are the ones making final recruitment decisions, many of these measures are
designed to reign in their penchant for patronage and push them to adhere to the merit-
based mechanisms. Over time, as NCSE has become more institutionalized in its selection
process, it has also become extremely popular with the general public. Each year, several
million college-educated youths flock to take the exam to join the government, even though
the odds of getting a spot is often less than 1 in 50. The steep competition, however, does
not deter or discourage applicants, as many continue to take the exam repeatedly, convinced
that they can succeed as long as they put in the due effort. The sustained popularity of
NCSE reflects a belief held by many college-educated youths today, which is that NCSE as
a viable channel of upward mobility. Being able to take advantage of NCSE, they are more
optimistic about their future prospect and thus less discontented with the regime.
A Comparative Perspective
The Chinese experience of adopting a system of civil service is by no means unique. In order
to modernize the government, many countries in the world had moved from a patronage-
based bureaucracy to a rational one, governed by politically neutral selection criteria based
on merit. However, scholars have proposed different explanations for civil service reform.
One of the explanation, in a democratic context, concerns with the electoral chances of
the incumbent party. Observing the adoption of civil service systems by individual states
in the U.S., Ting et al. (2012) argue that, while political parties favor a patronage system
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where they, when in power, can hand out government jobs in a targeted fashion in order to
strengthen their political influence, they do not want their rivals to do the same when they
are out of office. As a result, an incumbent party expecting to lose the upcoming election is
more likely to enact a civil service reform, so that its successor cannot benefit from the old
patronage system.
A similar story can be found in the developing world. Geddes (1994) explained how, and
why, Latin American countries sometimes succeeded in building bureaucratic capacity but
other times not. She contends that political leaders, acting as political entrepreneurs, only
enact reforms when it serves their own interests, as determined by political institutions and
circumstances. In other words, a leader would not bring about reforms such as meritocratic
recruitment if it hurts his or her political survival.
These two views, while highly informative on the motivation of political actors, do not
lend themselves readily to explain the Chinese case, where the CCP enjoys a rather secure
monopoly on political power. If there is no immediate threat to CCP’s political threat, why
did it decide to reform the civil service towards more meritocracy, especially in terms of
recruitment?
A different explanation for the adoption of merit-based civil service is rooted in an effi-
ciency argument. In a cross-national analysis, Rauch and Evans (2000) find that merit-based
recruitment is an important determinant of state capacity, in terms of both bureaucratic per-
formance and corruption control. This observed outcome is further expounded by Hollyer
(2010), where he associate the adoption of merit-based civil service recruitment with struc-
tural socioeconomic changes. It is argued that, when the level of skills or education rises
significantly amongst the politically unconnected, the government incurs a great opportunity
cost by adhering to a patronage-based system. In other words, merit-based recruitment al-
lows the government to tap into a larger pool of talent when politically connected candidates
are not always qualified. The experience of Prussia in the 19th century is a case in point.
11
Since Prussian nobility overwhelmingly focused on cultivating their military credentials in
the 18th century, and most university degree recipients were members of the bourgeoisie, it
became very difficult to find qualified noblemen to fill higher civil service positions (Mueller
1984). As a result, merit-based exams were introduced under Federick II to bolster bu-
reaucratic capacity, leading to the recruitment of university-educated civil servants, many of
them from the non-noble classes.
The argument I make in this dissertation is similar to Hollyer (2010), in that I also
focus on the politically unconnected in a regime. Different from Hollyer (2010), however, I
pay more attention to their perceived upward mobility under each recruitment system (i.e.,
patronage versus meritocracy) instead of their strategy for getting into the government. In
fact, even in the Prussian case, it was noted that “...during the early nineteenth century
the [Prussian] bureaucracy provided a carefully regulated opportunity for upward mobility
through entrance to its ranks” (Gillis 1971, 29). Consequently, I am primarily concerned with
the stability of the regime as a result of individual perception of upward mobility rather than
the regime’s economic performance, even though the latter also contributes to the former.
In fact,
4. Research Design: An Outline
To support my argument of institutionalized upward mobility and regime stability, I fo-
cus on the Chinese case and NCSE. I draw on an array of qualitative, quantitative, and
experimental evidence, gathered during my year-long fieldwork in China, including 45 in-
depth interviews with government officials, scholars, and NCSE experts; archival research of
government documents at both central and local levels; an original national representative
survey on public support for NCSE; two original survey experiments conducted exclusively
among government officials; and two existing surveys. Together, these sources allow me to
triangulate on the complex dynamic of merit-based elite recruitment among different players.
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The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following way. Based on the theory laid
out above, Chapters 3-6 are devoted to empirically testing the key observable implications
derived from the theory, as summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Observable Implications and Empirical Tests
Observable Implication Chapter Empirical Evidence
a. When unconstrained, local elites ex-
hibit patronage-based behavior in re-
cruitment.
3 Conjoint experiment conducted among
over 300 government officials.
b. By imposing institutional constraints,
NCSE reduces patronage practice and
promotes merit-based recruitment.
4 List experiment conducted among over
1600 government officials.
c. NCSE enhances individual perception
of upward mobility and weakens pref-
erence for redistribution.
5 Analysis of data from Chinese General
Social Survey (sample size 4,500+).
d. NCSE is perceived as a viable channel
of upward mobility by eligible citizens.
5 Analysis of data from Beijing College
Panel Survey (sample size 4,700+).
e. NCSE receives widespread public sup-
port as it is perceived as a viable chan-
nel of upward mobility.
6 Analysis of an original national survey
(sample size 4,100+).
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the dynamic between the CCP leadership and local officials in
the implementation of NCSE. In order to understand how meritocracy is enforced, in Chapter
3, I first conduct an analysis of local elites’ multidimensional preference for candidates during
recruitment, i.e., implication (a). Employing an original conjoint experiment, I estimate the
relative importance of candidate attributes such as competence, loyalty to the regime, and
personal connections to political insiders. I show that, when provided with relevant informa-
tion, government officials pay close attention and respond positively to candidates’ political
connections, even though they do not regard these connections as informational cues for can-
didates’ competence or ideological loyalty. At the same time, government officials do value
candidates’ competence and loyalty, suggesting that they are meritocratically minded as
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long as candidates’ political connections do not come into play. These findings indicate that,
without proper institutional constraints that filter out information on candidates’ political
connections, local officials are likely to engage in patronage-based recruitment.
In Chapter 4, I examine the effectiveness of institutional constraints in NCSE that have
been put in place over time to regulate incumbent elites’ behavior during recruitment. Tak-
ing advantage of a national survey of over 1600 government officials, I implemented a list
experiment to estimate the importance of candidates’ political connections during NCSE
recruitment. More importantly, I examine if institutional constraints in NCSE reduces the
influence of candidates’ political connections, i.e., implication (b). I find that government
officials who entered the government via NCSE themselves are significantly less likely to
consider candidates’ political connections as a key criterion for recruitment, indicating that
their personal experience with institutional rules in NCSE makes them less likely to engage
in patronage practice. By imposing necessary institutional constraints on local elites, there-
fore, NCSE can effectively reduce their patronage-based practice and create a more level
playing field for all. This, in turn, promotes upward mobility, especially for those who do
not have prior connections with political elites.
Chapters 5 and 6 shift focus from inside the ruling class to the effect of NCSE as an
institutionalized system of merit-based elite recruitment on the Chinese society at large. In
Chapter 5, I explore the dynamic between the regime and its college-educated youths, a
large and continually growing group. Specifically, I examine if NCSE has any effect on their
perception of upward mobility and attitude towards redistribution. To test implication (c),
I employ a difference-in-differences design to analyze data from the Chinese General Social
Survey(CGSS), a multi-year national representative survey. Taking advantage of the stag-
gered implementation date of NCSE across different provinces, I leverage the province-cohort
variation to estimate the effect of NCSE introduction on college-educated youths’ perception
of upward mobility and their distributive preference. I find that, compared to those who
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could not participate in NCSE due to an arbitrary age requirement, those who could report
significantly higher perceived upward mobility, both in retrospect and in prospect; they also
exhibit weaker preference for income redistribution.
To explore the causal mechanism through which NCSE affects individual perception and
attitude, in Chapter 5, I also test implication (d), using data from the Beijing College Panel
Survey, a probability sample survey of college students in Beijing. I find that students
from provinces where NCSE has been introduced for longer and thus has a more robust
implementation are more likely to choose civil service as their future career. It indicates
that merit-based recruitment leads more college-educated youths to believe that they have
a reasonable chance of joining the ruling elite class and regard NCSE as a viable channel of
upward mobility.
Last but not least, Chapter 6 examines how the general public feels about NCSE and
whether the level of support varies across different groups. With the aid of an original
national representative survey conducted in 2014, I find that overall there is a very high
level of support for NCSE among Chinese citizens. In particular, provinces with longer
history of NCSE implementation report higher support, indicating that public approval for
NCSE increases as the merit-based elite recruitment system continues to institutionalize.
On the individual level, successful experience with NCSE increases support for the exam; at
the same time, failed experience with NCSE does not diminish support, suggesting that the
selection process in NCSE is largely transparent and even-handed such that failed applicants
do not become embittered or disillusioned with the exam. Furthermore, I find that NCSE
contributes to citizens’ support for the local government and the political system in general.
It can be inferred that NCSE has become a source of legitimacy for the CCP regime.
Combined, these empirical tests provide evidence that the institution of NCSE is effective
in constraining local government officials and promoting meritocracy in elite recruitment; as a
result, it enhances the perception of upward mobility for college-educated youths and reduces
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their demand for redistribution. As they become more contented (or less discontented) with
the status quo, regime stability is strengthened.
5. Contribution
By studying in depth the merit-based elite recruitment institution in contemporary China
that is the NCSE, I highlight the role of social mobility in understanding regime dynamic.
The importance of upward mobility is better understood in the context of democracy. Going
as far back as Alexis De Tocqueville (1835), observers of democracies have long noted the
stabilizing effect of social mobility on the political system (e.g., Lipset and Bendix 1959;
Blau and Duncan 1967; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). In comparison, although upward
mobility under authoritarianism is often examined and its causes probed, its study has not
been systematically integrated into the theoretical inquiry of regime survival. Does upward
mobility – and in what ways – contribute to authoritarian resilience? My study hopes to
provide some answer on this question.
Based on the case of China, I seek to make a broadly comparative argument on how
authoritarian rulers can use merit-based elite recruitment as a survival strategy. Existing
literature on this topic focuses primarily on its impact on state capacity: Johnson (1982)
discusses its importance for the developmental state model; Evans and Rauch (1999; 2000)
point to its advantage in promoting economic growth. While I do not challenge their argu-
ment, I point to another function of merit-based elite recruitment, which is that it cultivates
a perception of upward mobility among non-elites and thereby reduces their discontent with
the regime. In a way, the non-elites are bought off by the regime with a promise that
they have a fair chance of moving upward, except that the regime does not pay them any-
thing in exchange for their support or acquiescence. Merit-based elite recruitment, therefore,
functions as a co-optation device, which is a common strategy used by authoritarian rulers
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2006; Magaloni 2006).
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In examining merit-based elite recruitment, my focus on its institutionalization also con-
tributes to a growing literature on how authoritarian rulers resort to institutions, which help
solve problems such as incredible commitment and information asymmetry, to strengthen
regime survival (Haber 2006; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Svolik 2012; Boix
and Svolik 2013; Truex 2016). By imposing institutional constraints on the elites and on
himself, the authoritarian ruler can better preserve the system of merit-based recruitment,
which enhances regime resilience in several ways.
Lastly, NCSE, as an institution that looms large in millions of Chinese youths’ lives
and serves as a bridge between them and the ruling regime, remains woefully understud-
ied. By comprehensively examining its institutional evolution and exploring the dynamic
between different actors, I hope to make a substantive contribution to the understanding of
an important aspect of political life in China today.
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Chapter 2
Civil Service Exam in Contemporary China
Civil service exam is not a novel idea in China. For more than a millennium, the imperial
courts of several dynasties had adopted a standardized examination to recruit talents to serve
in the government. This tradition, coupled with the Confucius teaching that the ultimate
purpose of learning and scholarship is to serve one’s country as a government official, has
perpetuated a belief, or even a myth, that anyone with the right qualification and talent can
enter the political elite class if he stands out from the merit-based competition. The Chinese
folklore is full of stories of individuals from humble beginnings who succeeded in the exam,
sometimes after repeated tries.
The contemporary civil service exam in the Poeple’s Republic of China, introduced in the
1990s, shares many similarities with the old practice, but it also differs in important ways.
To fully understand the inner workings of the civil service exam today and grasp its political
implications, it is imperative to understand the civil service, especially in the context of an
authoritarian Leninist party-state.
This chapter provides a comprehensive description of the civil service, focusing on issues
such as how the civil service came to be under the CCP leadership, who constitutes the civil
service, and why it enjoys the elite status vis-a`-vis the rest of the society. The latter part of
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this chapter focuses on the exam itself, providing readers with an understanding of how the
exam is administered, its format and content, as well as the public response to it.
1. History of Elite Recruitment in China
Keju: A Tradition of Meritocracy in Imperial China
China has a long history of meritocratic elite recruitment, the inception of which dates back
to Emperor Yang in the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 605). The imperial examination, more commonly
known as keju, was a comprehensive and elaborate system that recruited new ruling elites
for the imperial court by testing candidates on their mastery of classical canon in Chinese
literature and philosophy. Unlike most of its contemporaries, China’s reliance on keju to fill
public office meant that entrance to the ruling elite was on a competitive basis and there
was little to no hereditary ruling aristocracy (apart from the emperor himself).
For centuries, before its abolition in 1905, keju had served as a gateway for commoners
to leapfrog into the ruling elite class. In contrast to patronage-based elite recruitment,
keju did not discriminate candidates based on kinship ties or personal connections; instead,
it opened up the opportunity to all who were capable and desirous to enter the scholar-
official ruling class. Although an individual’s success in keju partly depended on his access
to education,1 which in turn was closely correlated with his socioeconomic class, the exam
nonetheless provided a valuable channel of upward mobility for those from non-elite family
background, especially in places where commoners enjoyed relatively easy access to literary
knowledge and education, thanks to the advent of printing technology. Historians agree
that keju helped transform the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907) from a military aristocracy to
a centralized government with a scholar gentry class, as it staffed the bureaucracy with an
increasing number of new elites with no prior connections with the aristocratic clans and thus
1Only men were allowed to participate in the exam and in politics, hence the masculine pronoun.
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weakened the power of the aristocrats. Similarly, the upward mobility provided by keju in the
Ming Dynasty is well-documented by Ho (1964), who shows that the proportion of jinshi,
or advanced scholars who had successfully passed the highest level of the imperial exam,
from families with no record of degree-holding of any kind in the past three generations was
consistently high, averaging over 40 percent throughout the fifteen and sixteenth centuries.
Although not a majority, it is impressive that individuals from humble background were at
all able to enter the ruling elite at the highest level. When comparing China to Europe, Max
Weber is said to have observed that, “strangers of unknown rank would be asked how many
examinations they had passed, not (as in Europe) how many ancestors of what social type
they had” (Woodside 2006).
Perhaps even more important than the actual upward mobility provided by the exam –
indeed, it tended to wax and wane both within and across different dynasties – is how it had
successfully created a long-lasting and widespread perception of upward mobility among the
Chinese population. Folk tales abounded to describe how men of humble origins were able
to ascend through keju by hard work and sheer determination; many devoted their lives to
taking the exam repeatedly in hope of eventual success. The perception of upward mobility
not only motivated men of great talents to join the ruling elite and hence helped strengthen
the state capacity of imperial China, it also served as a source of political stability in a
highly unequal society, as many sought socioeconomic betterment by taking advantage of a
channel provided by the existing political order rather than by overthrowing it. In fact, when
the Qing imperial court abolished keju in 1905, it drastically changed the future prospect –
actual or perceived – of many hopeful candidates and prompted a large number of them to
join the rebellion, which culminated in the 1911 Revolution that overthrew the regime (Bai
and Jia 2016).
The legacy of keju on contemporary China is profound. For the ruling class, it provides
a successful example of a meritocratic system for elite recruitment. For the ruled, it has
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forged a culture that places great emphasis on education and reinforced the notion that a
meritocratic elite recruitment system would not put non-elites at a disadvantage; on the
contrary, most people welcome the open competition and regard it as a viable path to move
up the socioeconomic ladder.
Elite Recruitment under CCP
After several decades of revolution and civil strife in the early 20th century, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949 and began to govern China in earnest. Bor-
rowing from the Soviet example, CCP established a cadre system of parallel Party and state
institutions at each level of the government, with the party providing political and policy
leadership and the state in charge of implementation. According to Barnett (1967), by
the early 1960s, China’s cadre management had matured into a powerful, party-dominated
system.
CCP’s revolutionary path to power profoundly informed its approach to and style of cadre
management in the Maoist era. Instead of an open-to-all merit-based recruitment system like
the imperial exam, the party relied heavily on class analysis to identify supporters and vi-
able candidates for personnel selection. Specifically, a key criterion for cadre recruitment was
whether an individual came from a proletariat background or had demonstrated revolution-
ary zeal. To the extent that this class/ideological consideration dominated decision-making,
other factors such as competence or technical expertise had to give way and played only
secondary roles. Although the official slogan for cadre evaluation was “red and expert” (you
hong you zhuan), in practice “red” (i.e. revolutionary credentials) was given significantly
more weight than “expert” (i.e. technical knowledge) in determining cadre selections and
promotions.
Moreover, during the Maoist era, personnel decisions were made based on cadre dossiers
and evaluations, which were “deliberated and conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy” (Man-
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ion 1985). The unilateral process by CCP without any input from or interaction with the
general population meant that only a small number of individuals who had prior contact
with party organizations would be considered for cadre recruitment. The vast majority of
Chinese citizens, regardless of their revolutionary zeal or technical expertise, did not have
any realistic opportunity to become part of the ruling elite even if they wanted to. In other
words, the recruitment system was not open for application or competition.
In the wake of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which had seen an onslaught on the
state apparatus and numerous purges of government officials at all levels, the party was left
with a shattered cadre system. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, CCP veered away
from revolutionary struggle and embarked on economic reform and modernization. The re-
building of the cadre system, therefore, was designed and carried out in service of the reform.
One major problem facing the party was that the existing cadre system was both outmoded
in organizational structure and deficient in personnel quality to meet the challenge of eco-
nomic development. Some aspects of the problem included life tenure without mandatory
retirement age for senior leaders and generally low educational level among cadres.
To better serve the goal of economic modernization, the party launched a series of effort
to reform its personnel system. At its 12th National Congress in 1982, CCP passed a new
party constitution, which spelled out the guidelines for cadre management. With regard
to cadre selection, the new constitution stated that the party must observe the principle
of “both political integrity and ability” (decai jianbei) so as to achieve elite transformation
in the direction of a “revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more professionally
competent elite corps” (ganbu duiwu de geming hua, nianqing hua, zhishi hua, he zhuanye
hua). Song Renqiong, the head of the CCP Central Organization Department at the time,
stressed that elite transformation was a long-term policy for the party and the related mea-
sures must be institutionalized (zhidu hua) over time.2 In the years following, policies such
2People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao). October 2, 1982. “Build a Cadre System Based on Principles of Rev-
olutionization, Rejuvenation, Learning, and Professionalization.” (Anzhao geming hua nianqing hua zhishi
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as mandatory retirement age and promotion of younger cadres with technocratic education
were implemented.
To deepen the personnel reform, CCP focused on establishing a rule-based, rational
institution of civil service to replace the old cadre system. In 1987, Party Secretary-General
Zhao Ziyang stated at the 13th CCP National Congress that, “[t]he focus of cadre system
reform at the moment is to establish an institution of national civil service.”3 Specifically,
the newly established civil service would only include the 4.2 million cadres working in
government organs; employees of other state sectors such as public institutions (shiye danwei)
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would not be part of the civil service (Burns 1989). As
indicated by the figures in Table 2.1, only a small fraction of existing cadres (i.e., less than
15%) went on to become civil servants after the reform.






Others (Parties, Mass Organizations, etc.) 1,500,000
Total 27,000,000
Note: This table is reproduced from Burns (1989).
In 1993, the central government promulgated the Provisional Regulations on the National
Civil Service, the first official document to outline the structure and management of the civil
service. It laid out the direction for various reform measures. On the issue of recruitment, the
Ministry of Personnel followed up by issuing the Tentative Provisions on National Civil Ser-
vice Recruitment in 1994, which served as a guideline to introduce standardized examination
as the principal recruitment method. In this document, the central government described the
hua zhuanye hua de fangzhen jianshe hao ganbu duiwu.)
3People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao). November 4, 1987. “Advance along the Road of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics (Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi daolu qianjin.)
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governing principles of recruitment as “open, fair, competitive, and meritocratic” (gongping,
pingdeng, jingzheng, zeyou).
In the following years, both the central and local governments experimented with using
exams to recruit new civil servants. These initial efforts, however, were cautious and limited
in scope. As the reform deepened, the CCP leadership decided to expand the scope of civil
service exam by calling for its universal adoption in all entry-level civil service positions,
thus establishing a system of National Civil Service Exam (NCSE). In 1996, People’s Daily,
the official CCP newspaper, introduced and promoted the concept of “all entries via exam”
(fanjin bikao, 凡进必考) as a central principle for NCSE.4 Simply put, it declared that all
entry-level positions in civil service must be filled via the exam system.
The principle of fanjin bikao was first adopted by the central government in 1996. Sub-
sequently, provincial governments heeded the call and adopted this practice in the following
decade. Since each provincial government is responsible for administering the civil service
exam for all four levels of local government under its jurisdiction (e.g., provincial, municipal,
county, and township levels), the introduction of NCSE in each province – marked by the
adoption of the fanjin bikao principle – meant that a large number of civil service positions
suddenly became available for open competition.
After a decade of civil service reform, many new practices – including the NCSE – were
enshrined into law when the Civil Service Law was enacted in 2006. More than twenty
complementary laws and regulations have since been put in place to further institutionalize
the management of civil service. In the section on recruitment, the Civil Service Law declares
that,
Article 21. In the recruitment of entry-level and other non-leadership civil service
positions, methods of open examination, close inspection, fair competition, and
meritocratic selection must be adopted.
4People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao. June 14, 1996. “Central Government Departments Widely Adopt Exam
in Recruitment; 737 Civil Service Positions to be Filled via Exam.”
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In addition, the State Administration of Civil Service (SACS) was established in 2008 to
oversee the management of civil service. Structurally, SACS is affiliated with the Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security; however, it is under direct leadership and supervision
of the State Council. There are five departments at SACS, each in charge of different
issue areas; one of them is the Department of Exam and Recruitment, which is devote to
implementing NCSE at both national and local levels.
With both the Civil Service Law and SACS in place, NCSE has become fully institution-
alized as the legally mandated channel for elite recruitment. It marks China’s return to a
meritocratic elite recruitment system in the modern era.
2. Civil Service: Professionalized Political Elite Class
The Civil Service Reform
The previous section briefly mentioned the personnel reform launched by the CCP leader-
ship in the 1980s and 1990s. In an effort to modernize and professionalize the government
bureaucracy, a serious of reform measures were introduced to revamp the personnel system.
One important product of the reform was the civil service.
To understand the difference between the civil service and its predecessor, the cadre
system, it is helpful to examine the legal definition of civil serviants. The first legal document
governing the civil service, Provisional Regulations on the National Civil Service of 1994, did
not provide a very clear definition, but it stated that,
Article 3. This document governs all personnel other than service staff working
in government administrative organs.
According to this definition, cadres working in state administrative organs were classified
as civil servants. Given the parallel systems of party and state institutions at each level
of government, which remains unchanged in the reform era, “state administrative organs”
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effectively refer to party and state organs in the government. In the Civil Service Law
enacted in 2006, a more detailed definition of civil servants is given.
Article 2. The term “civil servants” as mentioned in the present Law refers
to those personnel who perform public duties according to law and have been
included into the state administrative staffing and whose wages and welfare are
borne by the state public finance.
The definition declares that, among those who perform public duties, civil servants are
those who must have been included in the state “administrative staffing” (xinzheng bianzhi).
This detail is particularly important, as “administrative staffing” constitutes only part of
the cadre system. The cadre system consists of both government administrative organs and
public institutions, collectively referred to ‘as ‘public bureaucracies” by Ang (2012) . Al-
though personnel working in both types of organizations (with the exception of service staff)
are considered cadres and paid by state public finance, only those working in government ad-
ministrative organs are included in the state administrative staff; in contrast, those working
in public institutions are considered institutional staffing shiye bianzhi.
As such, even though the army of cadres in the public sector still ponderous, the civil
service – or the government bureaucracy proper – is a rather lean operation. Contrary to the
popular belief that the civil service is bloated, there are roughly only 7 million civil servants
at all five levels of the government today.5 In contrast, the public sector as a whole employs
over 50 million, but most of them work in public institutions that provide public services in
a semi-governmental capacity.6 The size comparison between the civil service and the entire
5According to a report by the Department of Human Resources and Social Security of China, there are
a total number of 7.167 million civil servants as of 2015. See http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/
dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201605/t20160530_240967.html
6According to one estimate, the public sector in China employs over 50 million people. This includes
both civil servants and employees of public institutions (shiye danwei) but excludes employees of state-
owned enterprises. See more details from a report by Phoenix Weekly at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_4b8bd1450102edb0.html (accessed on December 29, 2016).
26
public bureaucracy illuminates an important fact, which is that the civil service is a more
exclusive subset of the cadre system.
As made clear by the speech given by Zhao Ziyang at the 13th CCP National Congress
in 1987, the party envisioned a modernized and professionalized bureaucracy inside the
government.7 The old cadre system, staffed with personnel in all public sector organizations,
was too unwieldy to be efficiently managed by the party. Part of the personnel reform
was to devolve some of the party’s personnel management responsibility to various state
agencies. At the same time, however, the party did not intent on relinquishing control of
the core government bureaucracy. Creating the civil service as a distinct entity within the
cadre system allowed CCP to manage its government personnel differently than the rest of
the cadre system. Following the reform, the management of cadres in public institutions is
overseen by a state ministry, whereas civil servants are managed by the State Administration
of Civil Service, under the direct supervision of the State Council and the Department of
Organization of the CCP.
Although the civil service is small and selective in comparison to the old cadre system,
it spans all loci of political power, as the definition of “government administrative organs”
is rather broad. Unlike civil service in the west, which is essentially the executive branch
of the government, the Chinese civil service encompasses many, if not all, political jurisdic-
tions. First, it includes cadres working in both party and state institutions at each level
of the government, given the parallel organizational setup. Second, at each level, the civil
service encompasses not only government departments and agencies that implement laws
and policies, but also the People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference,
which are the legislative branch in the political system. Third, institutions in the judiciary
branch, including the courts and procuratorates, are part of the civil service, where judges
and procurators are civil servants. Lastly, key allies of CCP, including social organizations
7Ibid. 3.
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such as the All-China Women’s Federation and the United Front democratic parties, are
also included in the civil service. Together, the makeup of the civil service ensures that it
encompasses all locations of political power. By centralizing them under the umbrella of the
civil service, CCP can effectively and efficiently manage the personnel and other decisions.
Civil Servants’ Elite Status
One important difference between the Chinese civil service and its western counterpart is
that, due to the absence of publicly elected office, there is no clear distinction between
“politicians” and “bureaucrats” in China; although the civil service is sometimes referred to
as the “bureaucracy” (guanliao tixi), its jurisdiction encompasses the making, enforcement
and adjudication of law, as well as policymaking and implementation. Civil servants, there-
fore, represent the political elite class that discharges different types of political power in
the regime. Leaders of both party and state apparatus from township level all the way to
the central government are by law civil servants. Moreover, just like the cadre system in the
earlier era, the Chinese civil service is a closed hierarchy that promotes leaders strictly from
within and recruits new blood only at the very entry level. As a result, civil servants are
the only ones in the Chinese society with a possible career trajectory that leads to political
leadership positions.
The elite status of the civil service is reflected not only in its selectiveness and exclusive-
ness, it is also manifest in the prestige its power accords. The seven million civil servants
are at the core of the ruling coalition that CCP seeks to build. In order to make sure that
each civil servant – regardless of his or her rank – has a stake in the continued survival of the
regime, the party showers them with generous benefits and privileges unavailable outside the
system. Even as the market reform transforms the Chinese economy and rewards economic
activities, CCP makes sure that the ruling elites continue to reap disproportionate benefits
from their government offices.
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Exhibit A of the privileges civil servants enjoy is an income premium for the entire
profession (Liu 2015). Based on multiple waves of data from the Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP), we see that, not only is there a significant income effect for being a civil
servant, the effect has grown considerably over time. In 1988, at the beginning of the civil
service reform, the income gap between civil servants and the rest is rather small; the distance
has since widened, even as the private sector became more profitable. After controlling for
individual attributes that could influence income level, e.g., age, education, etc., we see that
civil servants still enjoy an income premium as large as over 40% in 2008 (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Income Premium for Civil Service
1988 1995 1999 2002 2007 2008
civil servant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.057) (0.042)
Obs. 17337 12551 6601 11609 7067 7008
Note: This table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of logged income on the dummy
variable “civil servant.” The regression controls for individual-level covariates including
gender, age, ethnicity, and education. Please see Table 2.3 for full results.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
More importantly, quantile regression analysis reveals that the income premium is not
driven by those at the top inside the civil service; on the contrary, it is larger towards the
lower end of the income distribution (Figure 2.1). This indicates that civil servants do not
have to rise to high ranks or leadership positions to benefit from their insider status. Rather,
once an individual enters the civil service, he or she would see an immediate boost in income
even at the entry level. The distribution of income premium within civil service shows that
CCP makes sure that all civil servants – regardless of their rank or position – are better off
economically compared to their peers outside the government.
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Figure 2.1: Quantile Regression Estimates of Civil Service Income Premium
Note: The six plots report quantile regression estimates for civil service income premium for
different years. The quantile regression controls for individual-level covariates including gender,
age, ethnicity, and education. The black dotted line in each plot represents the point estimate
from the quantile regression; the gray band represents its 95% confidence interval. The red solid
line represents the OLS point estimate; the pair of red dashed lines represent the 95% confidence
interval.
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The income premium can be attributed to two possible sources. First, civil servants’
salary is generally higher than their peers of comparable qualification in other professions.
Since the 1990s, the central government has gone through several iterations of salary reform
for civil servants, allowing local governments to disburse allowance out of local public coffers
without much supervision or regulation by Beijing. The central government has also admin-
istered several across-the-board salary raises. In short, the pay scheme in the civil service
provides its employees ample income. Second, despite the market reform, the Chinese gov-
ernment still plays a prominent role in economic development as the coordinator of economic
activities and manager of key resources (such as land). As such, civil servants, especially
those in leadership positions, often engage in rent-seeking activities that bring handsome
material gains. The anti-corruption campaigned waged by Xi Jinping in recent years may
have reigned in some of the activities, but, short of a institutional overhaul, the system is
still prone to corruption that benefits senior civil servants personally, i.e., “corruption by
design” (Manion 2004).
In addition to monetary benefits, civil servants also enjoy privileged access to scarce
social resources such as health care, pension, and housing. Specifically, the current system of
social health insurance in China gives civil servants extremely generous and comprehensive
coverage that is not available to those outside the government, although they have the same
contribution scheme as other urban employees. Similarly, civil servants are the only group
that continue to receive full pension directly financed by the state, whereas other urban
employees, including those in public institutions, have moved to a system of individual and
employer contributions; this means that civil servants suffer from little to no pay cut upon
retirement while others experience a significant reduction income during retirement.
The material benefits civil servants receive, although a significant premium, do not make
them the most well-off group in the Chinese society. In contrast, it is the high social esteem
and prestige civil service enjoy that truly makes them the elite class. The Chinese culture,
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for centuries, has venerated the official gentry class. Since the Chinese society operates with
a unique but pervasive relational culture of personal connections, or guanxi,8 being inside the
government is perceived as being closed to the power center. The proximity to political power
both commands respect and unlocks many scarce resources for civil servants. Regardless of
one’s rank inside the government, being a civil servant signals a status of political insider.
Taken together, both the tangible and intangible benefits that civil servants receive not
only make them the political elite class du jour, but also make the civil service a highly
coveted profession. The opportunity to enter the civil service, therefore, represents a chance
to move up the socioeconomic ladder, especially for those from non-elite background.
3. NCSE: Open and Meritocratic Recruitment
As part of the personnel reform, the National Civil Service Examination (NCSE) was in-
troduced in the 1990s. Following the Tentative Regulations on the National Civil Service in
1993, experiments of open and competitive examination was carried out by both the central
and local governments in their recruitment of new civil servants. Like many other major
policies in China, a national policy of civil service exam emerged gradually based on local
experiments and experiences of trial and error. The institutional structure and substantive
content of NCSE was standardized over time. With the enactment of the Civil Service Law
in 2006, as well as subsequent supporting measures governing various aspects of civil service
recruitment,9 NCSE became fully institutionalized in the sense that 1) it is mandated by law
as a national policy; 2) there is a state agency, i.e. the State Administration of Civil Service
(SACS), devoted to overseeing and regulating its implementation; and 3) actors involved in
the process would face disciplinary and/or legal actions if they do not play by the rules.
8According to (Bian 2002), guanxi is defined as the “interpersonal connections of sentiments and obli-
gations that dictate social interaction and facility favor exchanges.”
9These documents include Regulations on Civil Service Recruitment (2007), Disciplinary Measures for
Violations in Civil Service Exam, and Provisions on the Organization and Management of Interviews in
Civil Service Recruitment (2015).
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One of the main motivations for CCP to introduce an open and meritocratic recruitment
system like NCSE is to select good bureaucrats who are ideologically loyal to the regime
and have the compatible skills and necessary expertise for their jobs. This rationale based
on governing capacity is clearly laid out in many government documents. In the meantime,
there is another important consideration that goes into establishing a open and meritocratic
elite recruitment system, which is to allow a great number of Chinese citizens to have a
realistic chance of becoming part of the ruling elite. In other words, NCSE is to serve as a
platform that provides upward mobility for individuals to move from non-elite to elite class,
or at least to create a perception of upward mobility among Chinese citizens.
Although the upward mobility rationale is never explicitly stated, since it would be awk-
ward for CCP to admit to its elite status while it is supposed to be the vanguard of the
people, official documents repeatedly call for open and fair procedure in NCSE. Many mea-
sures that have been put in place to further institutionalize NCSE are specifically aimed
at making the exam transparent and free of patronage influence, such that all candidates,
regardless of family background or social connections, have a fair chance of competing based
on their performance and ability. Perhaps even more telling of this upward mobility moti-
vation is how the government promotes and publicize NCSE to the general public. News
coverage on this topic by government media outlets constantly touts the opportunity NCSE
provides for ordinary citizens to enter the political elite class. In particular, the notion of
fanjin bikao (i.e., all entries via exam) is repeatedly mentioned by the People’s Daily as a
guiding principle for NCSE . Based on my archival research, between 1996 and 2012, the
official party newspaper published 73 articles mentioning this key term, 18 of which appeared
in the pages of top news (yaowen). Many news stories on NCSE share the narrative of how
the open and fair competition allows capable individuals from non-elite background to join
the government. For instance, a People’s Daily article in 2012 on the front page highlights
that 87.1% of the over 15,000 newly recruited civil servants in the central government in
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2011 came from none-elite families; the figure for 2010 was even higher at 93.4%.10
It is evident from the CCP propaganda effort that the regime sees NCSE as a platform
that provides all with an opportunity to compete for government positions. Perhaps more
importantly, the party tries to make its citizens perceive NCSE as a viable channel of upward
mobility. The rest of this section provides a close examination of NCSE in terms of 1)
institutional structure and process and 2) content of the exam to show that the recruitment
system is set up – both procedurally and substantively – in a way that gives a chance to as
many people as possible.
Institutional Structure and Process
a). Multiple Exam Opportunities
The civil service exam takes place on an annual basis. Although NCSe is a national system
as indicated by its name, the exam is administered by the central government and provincial
governments separately to fill the new entry-level positions under their respective jurisdiction.
The exam administered by the central government, commonly known as the “state exam”
(guokao), is held every November to recruit new civil servants for departments and agencies
in the central government. The number of positions fluctuates somewhat from year to year,
averaging around twenty thousand in the past five years. Geographically, most of these
positions are located in Beijing, although some are in the local offices of departments under
the direct supervision of the State Council, such as the State Administration of Taxation
and the General Administration of Customs. The positions offered by the state exam are
highly coveted, since they are close to the political power center and usually have a promising
career trajectory in the central government. Another source of their popularity is the fact
that most of these positions are in Beijing and come with a Beijing household registration
10People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao.). March 2, 2012. “Central Government Recruits New Civil Servants;
Over 80% Come from Ordinary Families.” (Zhongyang jiguan xin luyong gongwuyuan, yu bacheng laizi putong
jiating.)
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(hukou), which is a thing of value in and of itself.
The great majority of civil service positions, however, are offered via the exams admin-
istered by provincial governments, often referred to as the “provincial exams” (shengkao).
They typically held in March or April each year; with few exceptions, most provinces hold
the exam on the same day every year. Although provincial exams may not be deemed as
prestigious as the state exam, they offer far greater numbers of positions – both in total and
per capita – as the exam in each province covers all four levels of local governments under its
jurisdiction (i.e., at the levels of province, prefecture, county, and township). The number of
positions in each province ranges from a few thousand to over ten thousand, depending on
its population size. For many potential candidates, provincial exams offer a more realist op-
portunity, both because the competition is (slightly) less fierce and because the job openings
are in the locality of their residence.
The existence of both the state exam and provincial exams provides individuals with
different options based on their ability and preference. The fact that the two exams are
scheduled at different times of the year also allow candidates to apply more than once
in order to maximize their chance. Both the state exam and provincial exams adopt the
same procedure; the questions on written tests for all exams come from the exam question
depository at the SACS. This ensures that candidates do not have to prepare for the two























b). Minimal Eligibility Criteria
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, NCSE begins with an open call for applications every year. The
respective governments in charge of administering the exam first make a public announce-
ment, together with a list of open positions. Individuals interested in taking the exam
subsequently apply for a specific position rather than a general qualification.
One defining characteristic of NCSE that makes it an open and inclusive platform for
competition is that it only has two basic requirements a Chinese citizens must satisfy in
order to be eligible to take the exam:
1. having a college degree, and
2. being between the age of 18 and 35.
Although some positions have additional requirements regarding applicants’ academic major,
education degree, or work experience, the education and age requirements are the only two
hard eligibility criteria. This means that all college-educated youths in China have a chance
to enter the civil service. Their decision whether to apply and compete for civil service jobs
is no longer dictated by officials with personnel authorities (such as the CCP branches in
universities) at a single time point (such as upon graduation); instead, now they can freely
choose to take the civil service exam for any year (or years) of their choosing, as long as they
remain age eligible.
The openness and inclusiveness of NCSE is further bolstered by the expansion of college
enrollment in China since 1999, which has seen a sharp increase in college-educated popula-
tion. College admission rate jumped from 34% to 56% between 1998 and 1999 and continued
to climb steadily in subsequent years. Since 2012, the admission rate has stayed around 75%,
with roughly 7 million high school graduates entering college each year (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Expansing College Enrollment
















































Note: Statistics presented in this graph are compiled by the author from
media reports. The dotted vertical line in the graph is drawn at year 1998,
which is the last year before the policy of college expansion was implemented.
As a result, a growing number of Chinese youths are college-educated and hence eligible
for NCSE. According to government reports, individuals with college education constituted
only 3.61% of the population in 2000 when college expansion first started; the percentage
increased to 8.93% in 2010 and to 12.45% in 2015.11 The figure is even higher for younger
age groups and urban dwellers. Based on data from the Chinese General Social Survey
(CGSS), which uses a national representative sample, for the year of 2013, the percentage
of college-educated respondents among all is 16.27%; it is 36.62% in the age group between
18 and 35, which can be further broken down into 66.48% for those born with an urban
hukou and 22.36% for those born with a rural/agricultural hukou. All the all, these figures
indicate that a large (and still growing) portion of Chinese youths nowadays have the option
of taking NCSE, should they want to enter the civil service. The parsimonious eligibility
11These statistics are from two government documents, including a report on the 2010 National Cen-
sus published by the National Bureau of Statistics (see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/
qgrkpcgb/201104/t20110428_30327.html) and a report on the 2015 1% National Population Sample Sur-
vey (see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160420_1346151.html).
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criteria of NCSE render the exam highly inclusive.
c). Two-Stage Selection Process
As indicated by in Figure 2.2, the selection process of NCSE consists of two stages – a written
test for all eligible applicants and a subsequent interview conducted by government officials.
Since applicants apply and compete for specific positions, the interview is granted to the top
five scorers on the written test for each position. Final decisions are then made primarily
based on candidates’ interview performance.
In term of transparency and fairness, the written test presents less of a challenge. Al-
though cases of cheating are occasionally reported, they are few and far between, as the
penalty for such behavior is severe. Moreover, as a measure of deterrence, and perhaps also
to demonstrate the government’s resolve to make the exam fair for all, rigorous vetting and
state-of-the-art technologies are conspicuously deployed at exam venues to prevent identity
fraud and cut off channels of communication.
Compared to the written test, selection during the interview is much more intricate.
Typically, a group of government officials form a panel of interviewers to evaluate candidates
and give scores accordingly; scores for each candidate are then tallied to determine the final
selection. According to NCSE guidelines, interviewers are expected to evaluate candidates
based on only interview performance, and interviewers are provided with no additional can-
didate information. In reality, however, it is common that candidates try to reach out to
interviewers or other government officials before the interview in an effort to increase their
chance of selection. These efforts to “pull strings” are usually made via family ties and
personal connections, and they are met with varied degree of success.
In order to reduce, if not completely eliminate, such practice, over the years, many
provinces have implemented additional measures to further improve transparency and fair-
ness of NCSE, especially at the interview stage. The most widely adopted measures include
39
double-blind interview assignments and shuffling of interview sites (such that neither the in-
terviewers nor the candidates have any prior information on the other party so coordination
between them is less likely), dropping the highest and lowest interview scores for each can-
didate (such that extremely partial opinions do not influence final selection), and immediate
score release (such that there is no tampering with selection results after the fact). While
these measures cannot completely eliminate the influence of patronage and nepotism, they
have significantly reduce such practice (Interview F14061; B14079; B14082; J14112; H15091).
Furthermore, in 2015, the central government issued the Provisions on the Organization and
Management of Interviews in Civil Service Recruitment, which makes many of the afore-
mentioned measures mandatory, requires interviewers to undergo mandatory training, and
spells out disciplinary action if interviewers violate the rules. Taken together, these measures
reflect a sincere effort by the central government to reduce non-meritocratic behavior and
other types of malpractice during NCSE interview.
Content of Examination
Equally important as the institutional structure of NCSE is the content of the exam. Since
what appears on the exam to a large extent determines who gets selected, the content of
NCSE is critical in ensuring that the system does not discriminate candidates based on their
background or create too much path dependence that disproportionately rewards candidates
who have always been “on the right track.” In other words, while selection in NCSE must
be based on merit, the notion of “merit” should not merely be a synonym for privileges
and structural advantage such as having been born into a large city or having attended
a good public school (both of which contribute to a candidate’s competence); instead, it
should also reflect an individual’s innate ability and drive to succeed, which are also highly
valuable attributes in a candidate. Overall, the format and questions used in NCSE strike
a balance between evaluating a candidate’s natural aptitude, human capital accumulation
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(i.e., education achievement), and investment of effort.
As illustrated in the second box in Figure 2.2, the standardized written test in NCSE
comprises two parts, a multiple-choice section and an essay question section. The former,
formally known as “government professional aptitude test” (xingzheng zhiye nengli ceyan), is
a two-hour session with 135 multiple-choice questions. The questions are classified into five
categories, namely 1) general knowledge (including topics such as domestic policy issues,
world affairs, science, and literature that reflect a candidate’s breadth of knowledge), 2)
language expression and reading comprehension (similar to the verbal section on the SAT or
LSAT in the United States), 3) mathematics, 4) logic and reasoning, and 5) material analysis
(which simulates policy analysis scenarios). The second part of the test, formally known as
“argumentation” (shenlun), asks candidates to write four short essays in three hours. The
essay questions are argumentative or propositional in nature and they are generally concerned
with either national policies or social issues.12
Similar to the SAT and other general standardized tests in the United States, the
multiple-choice questions in NCSE help identify candidates with higher aptitude and bet-
ter education. Candidates who grew up in a more informed environment or had exposure
to better educational resources have an advantage in answering some of these questions.
However, the large quantity of questions that one must answer under extremely tight time
constraint makes practice and preparation for the test extremely important. On average,
candidates have less than one minute for each question. Unless they are familiar with the
types of questions and have some built-in muscle memory on how to tackle them (especially
the mathematics questions), it is very hard to complete all questions in time, let alone doing
so correctly. Similarly, candidates can hone their essay writing skills rather quickly if they
are willing to invest the time and effort, especially since the essay questions are designed to
test their familiarity with current issues and government policies rather than their ability to
12Please see appendix for a sampling of NCSE questions.
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debate on philosophical ground.
Following the written test, the five top scorers for each position enter the next stage,
i.e., the interview. Questions asked during NCSE interviews are oriented towards problem-
solving; they primarily test candidates on their real world experience and interpersonal skills.
In short, with the types of questions used in the exam, selection in NCSE is based on
candidates’ demonstrated merit. This merit, however, is not purely a function of longterm
human capital accumulation (such as upbringing and schooling) alone; it also factors in innate
aptitude and the amount of effort invested towards NCSE. As such, although candidates
from more privileged background do enjoy an advantage, those from more humble origins
do also stand a chance. In fact, during my interviews with highly experienced instructors
at a nationally renowned exam preparatory school that specializes in NCSE, they stressed
repeatedly that, with practice and hard work, candidates who graduated from second-tier
universities have as good a chance of succeeding in NCSE as candidates from elite universities
(Interview B14102; B14103; H14101). Given that students from rural areas or less developed
provinces are less likely to enroll in elite universities in China, either due to lack of quality
education or smaller enrollment quotas, NCSE gives them a second chance to catch up on
the socioeconomic ladder.
This is an extremely important feature of NCSE, that an individual can compensate their
structural disadvantages with hard work. As long as a candidate is above a certain threshold
of intelligence and aptitude, what he lacks in longterm human capital accumulation he can
make up with focused preparation for the exam. Although it is debatable whether this
selection mechanism leads to an optimal outcome for the government,13 it does give millions
of Chinese youths a realistic opportunity to become part of the ruling elite, even if they have
not always come on top in their schooling years.
13On separate occasions during my fieldwork, I heard remarks by academics and government officials
alike that NCSE recruited civil servants who were “exam smart” but did not necessarily have policy acumen.
In the meantime, they acknowledged that NCSE had standardized the process and significantly reduced
patronage-based selection.
42
Moreover, since exam preparation requires substantial effort, it filters off candidates who
are less serious about working for the government. Although the questions on the test
do not directly evaluate candidates’ political loyalty, it is reasonable to argue that those
who are more loyal to the regime (or, at least, more enthusiastic about working for the
government) are more likely to work hard for the exam and subsequently succeed. By
allowing candidates’ effort – rather than accumulated human capital alone – to partially
determine their exam performance, NCSE is able to measure, albeit only approximately,
candidates’ political loyalty and select on it.
In a nutshell, the exam content of NCSE lets candidates compete on their effort as well as
intelligence and human capital accumulation. This gives many a second chance at entering
the elite class even if they did not attend elite universities for one reason or another.
Public Response to NCSE
The introduction of NCSE was met with immense public enthusiasm. College-educated
youths, regardless of family background, hukou, or employment status, were suddenly given
an opportunity to apply for government positions. The popularity of NCSE is illustrated
in Figure 2.4, which shows the numbers of job openings and applicants for the state exam
(guokao) between 2003 and 2018. The yearly number of applicants has exceeded one million
since 2009, and the applicant-position ratio has consistently stayed above 50:1. Provincial-
level exams are slightly less competitive, with a yearly average applicant-position ratio of
approximately 30:1 between 2007 and 2014.14
14There is no official release of statistics on NCSE in each province. To calculate this ratio, I collect the
number of positions and the number of applicants in each province by searching media reports and local
newspaper articles that quote relevant authorities on this issue, and compile the statistics for 20 provinces
(where such statistics are available) between 2007 and 2014.
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Note: Statistics presented in this graph are compiled by the author from
media reports.
The sustained popularity of NCSE indicates not only the attractiveness of civil service
as a career choice, but also the fact that NCSE is perceived as a realistic and viable channel
of upward mobility for many. Prior to NCSE, the government had a “job assignment”
system, in which it unilaterally identified and recruited individuals deemed qualified for jobs
in the government; the system did not provide any opportunity to individuals who were
interested in working for the government but did not have any prior connections – personal
or professional – with cadres in charge of recruitment in order to be considered. Since the
vast majority of ordinary citizens did not have connections with the government, they could
not even apply to jobs inside the government even if they wanted to. In contrast, NCSE
opened up the recruitment platform to all age-eligible college-educated youths. As discussed
earlier, many of its features, both institutional and substantive, make sure that not only is
the system largely merit-based in its selection, it also takes care to encourage those from less
advantaged or privileged background to apply and compete. The content of the exam tests
applicants on both their natural aptitude and their familiarity with the subject matters; it
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rewards talent but also effort. This gives hope to many who did not come from top-tier
universities. Moreover, NCSE allows applicants to take the exam for multiple times in both
the state exam and provincial exam without discriminating repeated takers, as long as they
remain age-eligible. This feature lets many remain hopeful of their upward mobility prospect
even after failed attempts (Interview B14109; B14122; F14062; J14114).
The effect of NCSE is evident not only on college-educated youths’ perception of upward
mobility, it is also manifest in their socioeconomic and political attitude. Interview evidence
suggests that, while acknowledging growing inequality, they are more tolerant of it (Interview
B14072, B14109, F14062, F14064). Also, while cognizant of the problem of petty corruption
by many government officials, they hesitate to condemn the practice; instead, during my
interviews with many applicants, it was implied – and, in one case, explicitly expressed –
that petty corruption was “part of the benefit package” they expected to receive if they could
succeed in NCSE (Interview B14083).
Beyond college-educated youths, NCSE has received widespread support among the pub-
lic. Although not everyone is eligible to compete, the public welcomes an institutionalized
merit-based system for elite recruitment for reasons including procedural justice (Interviews
B14085, B14086), improvement in local government service (Interviews H14102 J14112), and
potential upward mobility for family members and relatives. In short, NCSE helps boost
the legitimacy of the CCP regime.
NCSE, therefore, has profound implications for the CCP regime. The upward mobility
generated by the institutionalized merit-based elite recruitment makes a significant segment
of the Chinese society – those with college education – more optimistic about their upward
mobility chances and more tolerant of existing inequality in the regime. By promising an
open and transparent recruitment process, the regime manages to reduce their discontent




Below are some sample questions that are representative of the ones candidates see on
the written test of the NCSE. For the multiple-choice section, I present two questions for
each category, while the total number on the written test is 135.15 As illustrated by these
questions, the written test of NCSE evaluates candidates on two dimensions of competence,
namely their intelligence (i.e., both innate aptitude and accumulated human capital) and
preparedness (i.e., the ability to learn and improve in a short period of time).
Multiple-Choice 1: General Knowledge
15Source: Civil Service Information Network (http://www.gjgwy.org/).
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Multiple-Choice: Language Expression and Reading Comprehension
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Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.3: OLS Estimates of Civil Service Income Premium
1988 1995 1999 2002 2007 2008
civil servant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.057) (0.042)
male 0.134∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.021) (0.030) (0.041) (0.025) (0.014)
age 0.080∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004)
age2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ethnic Han -0.010 -0.019 0.000 -0.047 0.133 0.168∗∗
(0.017) (0.042) (0.046) (0.061) (0.145) (0.079)
high school 0.074∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.041) (0.019)
college 0.145∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.031) (0.047) (0.050) (0.031)
constant 5.601∗∗∗ 5.078∗∗∗ 5.899∗∗∗ 5.234∗∗∗ 8.309∗∗∗ 8.067∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.524) (0.448) (0.263) (0.236) (0.087)
Obs. 17337 12551 6601 11609 7067 7008
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of self-reported income
(logged) on a dummy variable indicating civil servant. Standard errors are clustered at the
city level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Understanding Elite Preference in Recruitment
Notwithstanding the many benefits that a system of merit-based elite recruitment can bring
for an authoritarian regime, including enhanced state capacity and upward mobility, its
implementation ultimately depends on local elites, who are both allies and agents of the
regime. Although regime survival is in their interest, other private considerations may lead
them astray and cause their preference in recruitment to diverge from that of the regime.
Before we examine how meritocracy is enforced in NCSE, it is imperative to first understand
elites’ preference in recruitment. As agents of the regime, do local government officials
faithfully execute the will of the central government and recruit candidates based on merit
alone? Or do they have any incentive to deviate from the meritocratic practice?
In this chapter, I delineate the multiple preference dimensions of Chinese local government
officials when recruiting new civil servants during NCSE and estimate the effect of each
preference dimension. My objective is to investigate whether local government officials,
when unconstrained, act in the best interest of the regime.
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1. Problem: Divergent Elite Preference
From the perspective of the dictator, political recruitment, when done correctly, can help him
resolve two challenges in regime survival, namely authoritarian power-sharing among elites
and authoritarian control over the masses (Svolik 2012). To address the first challenge, i.e.,
to maintain elite coherence, the dictator prefers to select individual with similar ideology.1
Recruitment of new elites is hence often based on their support for the regime (sometimes
indicated by membership to the ruling party, e.g., Walder 1995) or personal loyalty to the
ruler (Haber 2006; Egorov and Sonin 2011). To address the second challenge, i.e., to manage
the tension between the elite class and the masses, the dictator prefers to have capable
individuals in his coalition, whose skills and ability can contribute to both the repression
capacity and economic development of the state. In short, loyalty to the regime and personal
competence are the two key qualities a dictator looks for when recruiting new members into
the ruling class. In the case of China, the CCP has long championed the principle of “red
and expert” in political selection, which embodies the two key qualities valued by the regime.
Although authoritarian elites largely share the dictator’s goal of regime survival, their
preference could diverge from the dictator’s. On the one hand, they benefit from regime
survival in the long term; one the other hand, they are motivated by personal gains in the
short term. In the case of recruitment, elites often use government jobs as patronage and
hand them out to those who are close to them (Stokes 2009; Robinson and Verdier 2013). As
a result, while elites may value competence and loyalty in candidates, they may also favor
those who have political connections.
It is important, therefore, to understand the multiple dimensions of local elites’ prefer-
ence, as they are often the ones in charge of recruitment. Does their preference diverge from
that of the regime? How does that affect the supposedly meritocratic process? To answer
1According to Svolik (2012), the term ideology is used in a broad sense, “incorporating any nonmaterial
factors that may affect a citizen’s preference for the incumbent dictator vis-a`-vis the challenger, including
religious, ethnic, and charismatic attributes of the dictator and the challenger.”
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these questions, I look at how local government officials in China make selection decisions in
NCSE when they have unfiltered information on candidates.
2. Empirical Strategy
To unpack local officials’ multidimensional preference in elite recruitment, I independently
designed and implemented a survey experiment in 2015. I employed a conjoint analysis
(Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014), where pairs of hypothetical NCSE candidate
profiles were presented to respondents and they were asked to choose which one to recruit.
The survey was conducted among over 300 government officials exclusively, which rendered
the survey questions highly realistic for respondents and allowed for data collection from a
sample closely resembling the actual decision-making body. To my knowledge, this is the
first conjoint experiment conducted among government officials in China.
Challenges in Studying Authoritarian Political Selection
There are several key challenges in measuring the effects of competence, loyalty, and political
connections on political selection. Studies using observational data often encounter the
problem of correlated individual attributes or multiple attributes being bundled in one piece
of information. The observational equivalence renders interpreting causal relations difficult.
In China, as the CCP tries to co-opt capable individuals into the ruling class, signals of
loyalty can sometimes imply competence. Similarly, individuals with political connections
are more likely to have access to better education and other resources that make them more
competent; and they may also be perceived as more loyal to the regime. By employing
a conjoint experiment, I overcome this challenge by measuring the marginal effect of each
attribute, i.e. the attributes are orthogonal to one another by design. The use of both
choice-based and rating-based questions also provides an opportunity to parse out the effect
of each attribute in selection decisions.
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Another confounding factor in studying political selection with observational data is the
issue of name recognition, especially when dealing with the effect of political connections.
When a candidate is associated with a political elite with name recognition in real life,
what is being measured is the effect of association with that particular individual rather
than the effect of political connections per se. Moreover, in an authoritarian setting, the
effect of association with a recognized name may go in either direction, depending on the
relationship between the selector and the elite associated with the candidate (i.e., either
allies or adversaries). Without complete information on the internal dynamics among elites,
it is impossible to achieve an accurate estimate of the effect of political connections. By
using hypothetical candidates, the conjoint experiment ensures that respondents’ evaluation
of political connections is not interfered by name recognition.
For all the problems of working with observational data to understand entry-level political
selection in China, the biggest challenge is the lack of data. To overcome this problem,
scholars often resort to survey methods. One main concern with using traditional survey
methods to study this topic is the issue of social desirability bias (DeMaio 1984; Nadeau
and Niemi 1995; Tourangeau and Yan 2007). The use of a conjoint experiment limits social
desirability by simultaneously presenting multiple attributes in one profile. This design
affords respondents multiple reasons to justify their choice and hence reduces their concern
over sensitive items such as political connections.
A Conjoint Experiment
The main objective of the experiment is to test the relative importance of three factors in elite
recruitment, namely a candidate’s personal competence, loyalty to the regime, and political
connections. The survey uses randomly generated profiles of hypothetical candidates, each
consisting of seven personal characteristics. Figure 3.1 is an example of the design translated
in English. (See Figure 3.6 in Appendix for the original version in Chinese.)
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Figure 3.1: Design of Conjoint Table & Questions (English Translation)
  Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
Award Won in College Academic Excellence Student Leadership 
Father’s Occupation Government Official Private Sector Worker  
Prior Work Experience No Experience Government Job 
Political Affiliation CCP Member CCP Member 
College Attended Elite University General College 
Gender Female Male 
Education Level Master Degree Bachelor Degree 
 
a. Which candidate are you more inclined to choose? 
 Candidate 1  Candidate 2  
 
b. Do you think they are suitable and qualified for the civil service job? 
Please rate each candidate respectively. 
1 means completely unsuitable and unqualified; 5 means highly suitable and highly qualified.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Candidate 1      
Candidate 2      
 
c. Please rate each candidate on leadership quality that he/she is likely to demonstrate on the 
job. 
1 means no leadership quality; 5 means very high leadership quality.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Candidate 1      
Candidate 2      
 
d. Please rate each candidate on task implementation ability that he/she is likely to 
demonstrate on the job. 
1 means no task implementation ability; 5 means very high task implementation ability.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Candidate 1      





The survey begins with a scenario description that puts the respondent in the position
of a government official who is interviewing candidates on behalf of his or her work unit.
Scenario Question: The government department you work in plans to recruit
one entry-level civil servant via the NCSE this year. On behalf of your depart-
ment, you are interviewing the five finalists who have passed the written test.
Assume that the two following candidates perform equally well during the in-
terview. Based on their additional personal information provided below, which
candidate are you more inclined to choose?
Following the description, the respondent is presented with a pair of candidate profiles.
Every profile includes seven attributes, each providing an important piece of information
about the candidate. Each attribute in turn is varied into several values that distinguish
candidates from one another. In total, all attribute values generate about 1,000 unique
candidate profiles. The row positions of the seven attributes in the table are randomized to
limit possible row-specific effects, but they are held constant for each respondent to reduce
cognitive difficulty.
While there are many factors that could potentially influence a candidate’s chance of
selection, I incorporate only seven attributes (summarized in Table 3.1) for theoretical con-
sideration and practical concerns. To render the survey as close to reality as possible, only
information that is usually available to NCSE interviewers is presented.2 A detailed de-
scription of each attribute and the rationale for its inclusion can be found in Appendix A.
In summary, four attributes contain values that signal competence relative to their respec-
tive reference categories; two attributes contain values that indicate loyalty to the regime;
another attribute, father’s occupation, contains the value government official to signal a
2Availability of information on candidates’ political connections depends on whether, and what kind of,
institutional rules are put in place to filter out such information. This varies by province, as each province
is responsible of administering NCSE within its jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for interviewers
to learn about such information.
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Table 3.1: Attributes & Values Used in Candidate Profiles
Attributes Values Original Chinese Text
Gender Female 女
Male 男
Political Affiliation None 群众
CCP Member† 中共党员
College Attended General College 普通地方院校
Elite University∗ 985重点高校
Education Level Bachelor Degree 大学本科
Master Degree∗ 硕士研究生





Prior Work Experience No Experience 无(应届毕业生)
Company Job 普通公司工作
Government Job∗ 基层行政工作
Father’s Occupation Private Sector Worker 私企普通员工
SOE Worker (CCP Member) 国企普通职工(党员)
Private Entrepreneur 企业家
Government Official 政府官员
Note: The first value in each attribute is taken as the reference category in the analysis.
An attribute value with an asterisk ∗ indicates that it is a signal of competence relative
to the reference category; an attribute value with a dagger symbol † indicates that it is a
signal of loyalty relative to the reference category.
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candidate’s political connections. While political connections can take many forms, I choose
the most direct one, i.e. that by kinship, so that respondents would not miss the informa-
tion. Two additional values, i.e. SOE worker (CCP member) and private entrepreneur, are
included in father’s occupation as placebos to test possible causal mechanisms of political
connections.
Following the conjoint table, the survey asks a series of questions to measure the outcomes
of interest. The first question asks the respondent to choose the preferred candidate to
recruit (i.e. a choice-based question), followed by another question that asks the respondent
to rate each candidate in terms of being “suitable and qualified” for the job on a scale of 1-5
(i.e. a rating-based question). In addition, the respondent is asked to rate each candidate
on “leadership quality” and “task implementation ability,” both of which are important
competence qualities valued in a civil servant. Task implementation is arguably the most
relevant and desirable quality in an entry-level civil servant, as his or her main job description
is to perform tasks delegated by superiors.
Each respondent is presented with five pairs of profiles and repeats the tasks for each
pair. At the end of the survey, the respondent is asked a series of personal information
questions.
Based on the survey design, I simultaneously test three main hypotheses as follows.
H1: Individual attributes that signal personal competence increase a candidate’s
probability of being selected in NCSE.
H2: Individual attributes that signal loyalty to the regime increase a candidate’s
probability of being selected in NCSE.
H3: Individual attributes that signal political connections increase a candidate’s
probability of being selected in NCSE.
In addition, I explore possible causal mechanisms through which political connections
influence selection. This is important for understanding whether respondents value political
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connections for meritocratic reasons or otherwise, i.e. it is plausible that they regard political
connections as a signal of competence or loyalty. Alternatively, they may view political con-
nections as a basis for patronage practice, either because connections constitute a currency
for political transactions or they have a stronger psychological affinity for these candidates.
Due to sensitivity of this topic, the hypotheses on political transactions and psychological
affinity cannot be directly tested. Instead, I test the following three hypotheses.
H3.1: Candidates with political connections are more likely to be selected in NCSE
because they are perceived to be more competent.
H3.2: Candidates with political connections are more likely to be selected in NCSE
because they are perceived to be more loyal to the regime.
H3.3: Candidates with political connections are more likely to be selected in NCSE
because they have stronger social networks.
To test Hypothesis 3.1, I compare the effects of attribute value government official in fa-
ther’s occupation on the choice outcome and the rating outcomes. If offspring of government
officials are simultaneously favored in selection and rated more highly for their competence
qualities, it is likely that they are viewed as more competent than others.
To test Hypothesis 3.2, I compare the effect of a placebo value in father’s occupation, SOE
worker (CCP member), with that of government official on the choice outcome. If offspring
of government officials are perceived as more loyal to the regime, so should offspring of
SOE workers who are also party members, as both types are likely to have been raised in a
pro-regime family environment and influenced by parents’ pro-regime sentiments.
Hypothesis 3.3 concerns the possibility that respondents view candidates’ political con-
nections as a source for rent-seeking outside government. To test it, I compare the effect of
another placebo value in father’s occupation, private entrepreneur, with that of government
official. Since both occupations indicate that the candidate has a strong social network as
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a result of his or her father’s high social status,3 both attribute values should have similar
positive effects on selection, should this hypothesis be true.
If any of the three hypotheses are confirmed, we would have some conclusive evidence
on how political connections influence NCSE recruitment. If, on the other hand, all three
hypotheses are rejected, it would at least move us closer to the real causal mechanism(s) by
way of elimination. In other words, it would increase the likelihood that political connections
are valued because they allow elites to engage in patronage practice.
3. Data Collection & Analysis
The survey was implemented between August and November of 2015 in China. In order to
collect data from a sample as representative of the actual decision-making body as possible,
only government officials were recruited as respondents.
To reach as many government officials as possible, the survey was implemented both
online and offline. Both versions had the same layout and design. The online survey was
disseminated to known government officials via social networking applications. A total of
113 completed responses were returned. The offline survey was implemented using paper
questionnaire. To account for possible regional heterogeneity, the survey was conducted in
five cities in different parts of China. The range of cities selected covers both the coast and
inland, north and south, and account for variation in economic development and adminis-
trative rank. Questionnaires were administered in classrooms of cadre training workshops
and Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs in local universities, both of which
were attended by government officials exclusively. Admittedly, sampling among attendees of
these programs is not random. However, government officials who attend these programs are
usually occupants of leadership positions or hopefuls for political promotion; they are hence
more likely to be representative of actual NCSE interviewers. The offline implementation
3The original Chinese text for “private entrepreneur” is qiyejia, which has a positive connotation and
suggests that the person is highly successful and well-respected.
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returned 219 completed responses.
In total, 332 valid responses were collected. Though not a probability sample, it is roughly
representative of the Chinese civil service in terms of observed demographic characteristics
(Table 3.2). In particular, the sample has a good portion of respondents who have experience
with political selection: 39.6% of the respondents either hold leadership positions or have
actual experience of interviewing candidates in NCSE, and 49.0% of the respondents hold
bureaucratic ranks of deputy section chief or higher. These statistics indicate that about half
of the respondents in the sample are political elites who are entrusted with the authority to
make personnel decisions. This adds external validity to the study. Furthermore, the online
and offline portions of the sample exhibit similar respondent characteristics (see Table 3.3
in Appendix). Since each respondent was asked to evaluate five pairs of candidate profiles
(i.e. 10 profiles per respondent), a total of 3,320 observations were collected for analysis.4
Table 3.2: Conjoint Experiment: Respondent Characteristics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Male 332 .578 .494 0 1
Age 314 35.4 9.63 22 59
CCP Membership 332 .816 .387 0 1
Bureaucratic Rank 323 2.01 1.33 1 6
Leadership Position 329 .299 .458 0 1
Interviewer Experience 329 .222 .416 0 1
According to Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), a fully randomized conjoint
analysis nonparametrically identifies the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each
of the attribute values on the probability of a profile being chosen. By using respondents’
observed choice responses as the basis of inference, conjoint analysis is able to estimate
the causal effects of many treatment components simultaneously and without resorting to
functional form assumptions.
4More details on survey implementation and data description are presented in the Appendix.
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I estimate the AMCE of each attribute value using a regression-based estimator. With
attribute values randomized independently from one another, the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression produces unbiased and consistent estimates of AMCEs. The data is fit
using the following linear model,





βldXldijk + ijk (3.1)
where Yijk ∈ {0, 1} is the binary outcome variable indicating whether profile j in task k of
respondent i is chosen, Xldijk is the dummy variable for the dth value of attribute l, βld is
the corresponding coefficient, and ijk is the error term, which is statistically independent
of the regressors due to randomization of attributes. Note that the seven attributes are
indexed by l ∈ {1, 2, .., 7} and the values in each attribute l are indexed by d ∈ {1, ..., Dl}.
The OLS estimate of βld is thus the estimate of AMCE for the dth value of attribute l,
with White cluster-corrected standard errors to account for within-respondent correlation
of preferences. The same approach is used in analyzing rating-based responses, where the
outcomes of interest are continuous instead of binary.
4. Main Results
Rivaling Effects of Divergent Preferences
Results on the primary outcome of interest, candidate choice, are reported in Figure 3.2,
which displays the estimated AMCEs on the probability of being selected. At least one
value in each attribute has a significant effect relative to the reference category.
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    Government Official
    Private Entrepreneur
    SOE Worker (CCP Member)
    Private Sector Worker
Father's Occupation:
    Government Job
    Company Job
    No Experience
Prior Work Experience:
     
    Student Leadership
    Academic Excellence
    Community Outreach
    Artistic Talent
    No Award
Award Won in College:
    
    Master Degree
    Bachelor Degree
Education Level:
   
    Elite University
    General College
College Attended:
  
    CCP Member
    None
Political Affiliation:
 
    Male
    Female
Gender:
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Change: Probability of Being Selected
Note: This plot shows the estimated AMCEs of attribute values on a candidate’s probability of
being selected for the civil service job. The outcome is a dichotomous variable coded “1” for
being selected and “0” for not being selected. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model
with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence
intervals. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.
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Among them, attribute values signaling competence exclusively all have significant posi-
tive effects, including elite university in college attended (11.5%), master degree in education
level (4.87%), academic excellence in award won in college (9.14%), and government job in
prior work experience (15.8%). They show that competence – either in the form of intellec-
tual capacity or human capital accumulation – is highly valued in political recruitment.
Similarly, attribute values signaling loyalty to the regime also have significant positive
effects, including CCP member in political affiliation (7.93%), community outreach (20.1%)
and student leadership (23.4%) in award won in college. They show that, being politically
loyal or demonstrating a willingness to be co-opted by the regime increases a candidate’s
chance of selection.
For political connections, we look at government official in father’s occupation. Not only
does it increase a candidate’s probability of selection by 21.7%, its effect magnitude is the
second largest among all, only next to that of student leadership in award won in college,
which is a compounded signal of both competence and loyalty.
The findings on candidate choice provide strong evidence in support of the three main
hypotheses. On the one hand, local officials do follow the meritocratic principle that cham-
pions competence and loyalty; on the other hand, they allow other factors such as political
connections to influence their decisions.
To check whether these findings are robust, I look at the rating outcomes in the next
question. If government officials are consistent in their judgment, they should rate the
candidate of choice in each pair more highly than the other one. Moreover, by not forcing
respondents to pick a winner in each pair, the rating-based question reflects their attitude
towards each attribute value more accurately. Figure 3.3 presents the estimated AMCEs
on a candidate’s rating for being “suitable and qualified” for the job. The results are very
similar to that of the choice-based question and provide further evidence to support the three
main hypotheses (see Table 3.5 in Appendix for detailed reporting on the estimates).
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    Government Official
    Private Entrepreneur
    SOE Worker (CCP Member)
    Private Sector Worker
Father's Occupation:
    Government Job
    Company Job
    No Experience
Prior Work Experience:
     
    Student Leadership
    Academic Excellence
    Community Outreach
    Artistic Talent
    No Award
Award Won in College:
    
    Master Degree
    Bachelor Degree
Education Level:
   
    Elite University
    General College
College Attended:
  
    CCP Member
    None
Political Affiliation:
 
    Male
    Female
Gender:
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Change: Rating on Being Suitable and Qualified
Note: This plot shows the estimated AMCEs of attribute values on a candidate’s rating of being
“suitable and qualified” for the civil service job. The outcome is a continuous variable on a scale
of 1-5. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with standard errors clustered at the
respondent level. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The points without horizontal
bars denote the reference category for each attribute.
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Amid the overall consistent results, a few things stand out. While male candidates
are clearly preferred when a choice must be made, they are not considered more suitable or
qualified than their female counterparts. It is also the case for CCP members when compared
to non-members. The discrepancies between choice and rating suggest that selection is not
purely meritocratic; local elites’ idiosyncratic tastes also influence their decisions.
The AMCE estimates for government official in father’s occupation on both choice and
rating outcomes are similarly large (21.7% and 17.8%, respectively), indicating that elites
consistently prefer candidates with political connections. In the next section, I explore
possible mechanisms through which candidates’ political connections contribute to their
advantage in selection. Specifically, I present an analysis on whether political connections
serve as an informational cue for candidates’ competence or loyalty.
Political Connections: Exploring Causal Mechanisms
Based on the survey design, I test three hypotheses on possible causal mechanisms of political
connections. First, to examine whether candidates with political connections are perceived as
more competent, I analyze two additional rating questions on specific competence qualities:
1) leadership quality and 2) task implementation ability. Figure 3.4 presents the results; the
patterns of estimated AMCEs are largely consistent with previous results.
A closer look at the estimates for government official in father’s occupation, however,
reveals that candidates with political connections are not rated more highly for task imple-
mentation (see panel on the right). Although they are perceived as possessing more lead-
ership quality (see panel on the left), these results do not provide conclusive evidence that
politically connected candidates are regarded as more competent, especially for entry-level















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next, I go back to Figure 3.2 to compare the AMCE estimate of government official to
that of two placebo values in father’s occupation, namely SOE worker (CCP member) and
private entrepreneur. Neither placebo has a significant effect on candidate choice, which
leads us to reject the hypotheses that politically connected candidates are favored because
they are perceived to be more loyal or because they have stronger social networks outside
the government.
Although the rejection of hypotheses 3.1-3.3 does not provide conclusive evidence on the
causal mechanism(s) of political connections, it does provide some important information.
Rejection of hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, in particular, indicates that political connections do not
function as a cue for candidates’ competence or loyalty; government officials are not thinking
of the meritocratic principle when they consider candidates’ political connections.
Furthermore, rejection of these hypotheses helps to narrow the range of possible causal
mechanisms. It is more likely that political connections influence selection because elites are
motivated by political transactions or by psychological affinity, both of which could facilitate
patronage practice. In fact, by adding an interaction effect of government official in candi-
date’s father’s occupation with respondent’s work unit (see Figure 3.5), the analysis shows
that, while the effect of political connections is significant across all branches of government,
it is particularly pronounced in party organizations (45.1%). Since party organizations are
the political power centers at each level of government, local elites in these workplaces are in
better position to use recruitment as patronage to pursue material gains or cultivate personal
loyalty in candidates. However, this is only exploratory evidence.
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−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Change: Probability of Being Selected
Note: This plot shows the estimated average component interaction effects (ACIEs) of a can-
didate’s political connections with a respondent’s work unit on the candidate’s probability
of being selected for the civil service job. Estimates are based on an OLS model including
all attribute values as well as an interaction term between a dichotomous variable for can-
didate’s political connections (measured by government official in father’s occupation) and
respondent’s work unit. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Horizontal bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
The baseline estimate for the reference category, executive government branch, is denoted by
a point without horizontal bars; it has a value of 0.262.
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Robustness Checks
One indication that the results presented so far are robust is that the AMCE estimates across
different outcomes exhibit similar patterns, which suggests that respondents’ multidimen-
sional preference is stable when evaluating candidates in various aspects. To ensure that
the results are not driven by any particular respondent groups, I estimate the heterogeneous
effects across several theoretically relevant subgroups, divided by gender, age, bureaucratic
rank, and authority over personnel decision, respectively. The four panels in Figure 3.8 show
that AMCE estimates for respondent subgroups are highly consistent, indicating that the
effects are not sensitive to particular respondent characteristics. It also means that there is
wide consensus among local officials regarding preference in elite recruitment.
To examine different ways of addressing the clustering of profiles by respondents, I repli-
cate the analysis on candidate choice while adding respondent fixed effects and respondent
random effects (Figure 3.9. The results are nearly identical to the benchmark model.
Moreover, given that the sample comprises online and offline respondents who were re-
cruited using different methods, I estimate the AMCEs for these two groups separately,
which again are highly consistent with the main results (Figure 3.10). Estimates for the
online group have slightly larger 95% confidence intervals due to smaller sample size.
Lastly, I perform diagnostic tests on some of the assumptions entailed by the conjoint
design, including no carry-over effects and no profile-order effects, by estimating AMCEs by
task number and by profile position separately. Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show that the
results do not differ significantly, thus further validating these assumptions.5
5Amid the highly consistence results in Figure A6, AMCE estimates for Pair 1 are more subdued than
that for the other pairs. This is likely caused by respondents’ lack of familiarity with survey questions at
the beginning rather than any carry-over effects. As respondents proceed to evaluate subsequent pairs of
profiles, they become more familiar with the tasks and, as a result, their preference more stabilized.
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5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter focuses on the dynamic between the CCP leadership and local government
officials in the implementation of elite recruitment. While the goal of the leadership is to
recruit individuals who are competent and ideologically loyal to the regime, I show that
local officials have divergent preference when choosing candidates. Employing a conjoint
experiment, I find that local officials clearly favor candidates with political connections,
although they do not consider these candidates to be more competent or loyal. It indicates
that local officials are motivated by private considerations such as patronage when they are
in charge of elite recruitment. If unchecked, their behavior would undermine the meritocratic
principle in NCSE and weaken upward mobility opportunity for non-elites.
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Appendix
In the appendix, I provide detailed information on the conjoint experiment discussed in
Chapter 4, including the experiment design, details of survey implementation, description of
data collection, as well as additional tables and figures referenced in the chapter.
1. Experiment Design: Attributes and Values
In the conjoint experiment, seven attributes are incorporated to constitute a hypothetical
NCSE candidate profile, and each attribute is varied into several values. The attributes
and values are designed to test the three preference dimensions of interest, namely personal
competence, loyalty to the regime, and political connections. Below, I provide a description
of each attribute and its values, as well as the rationale for including it in the conjoint table.
1. Gender: The two values of this attribute are male and female. Given the unequal
gender representation in the Chinese government, especially among leaders of all levels,
there is reason to believe that government officials take gender into account when
recruiting new civil servants. I do not, however, consider gender a signal of competence,
loyalty or political connections. This attribute is also included to make the hypothetical
profiles more realistic for respondents.
2. Political Affiliation: The two values in this attribute are none and CCP member.
Since the 1990s, the CCP has made an effort to recruit more college students into
the party; membership has become less competitive and more common on university
campuses. The question of whether to join the CCP, therefore, is now largely a choice
for college students, especially those in elite universities. Those who are more sup-
portive of the regime or contemplate a career in the government are more likely to
become party members. Relative to none, CCP member is thus a signal of loyalty to
the regime.
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3. College Attended: The two values in this attribute are elite university and general
college. College admission in China is strictly based on student performance in a
national examination that is offered only once a year to high school graduates. The
system of admission provides a singular incentive to all students, which is to study hard
and do well academically. The admission scores for elite universities are substantially
higher than that for general colleges, thus separating students of higher aptitude from
the rest.6 The type of college attended by a candidate is therefore a reliable indicator
of his or her academic merit and ability to learn on a new job. Relative to general
college, elite university a clear signal of competence.
4. Education Level: The two values in this attribute are bachelor degree and master
degree. According to the eligibility requirements, all NCSE candidates must be college
educated, which means that any candidate has at least a bachelor degree.7 Compared
to candidates with a bachelor degree, those who have obtained a graduate degree are
more specialized in their fields of studies and tend to bring more expertise to the job.
In fact, in recent years, a graduate degree has become a requisite for promotion at
many government leadership positions.8 Through the accumulation of human capital,
master degree signals competence when compared to bachelor degree.
5. Award Won in College: This attribute has five values, including no award, artistic
talent, community outreach, academic excellence, and student leadership. College stu-
dents in China compete for various awards while in school. Some of the awards are
common in most universities and their selection criteria nearly universal. As a result,
6The original wording for “elite university” in Chinese used in the survey is “985 Project” Key University,
which is a list of 39 higher education institutions - arguably the most prestigious in China - out of some 2,500
universities in total nationwide. For more details on Chinese universities, please see http://edu.people.
com.cn/n/2015/0528/c244541-27071607.html (accessed December 29, 2016).
7There are candidates with doctorate degrees applying to join the civil service. Given the small number,
however, doctoral degree is not included as an attribute value.
8It should be noted that, although many leadership positions are now only open to contenders with
graduate degrees, since civil servants often have the option of doing a part-time graduate program while on
the job, it is not absolutely imperative that they first enter the civil service with a graduate degree.
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they are viewed as reliable signals of certain qualities of the recipients when compared
to those who have received none.
Artistic talent is an award for students who are active on the cultural or arts
scene on campus. Recipients of this award generally possess good inter-personal skills
that could be useful on a civil service job. They are, however, not necessarily more
competent for government jobs or more loyal to the regime. This award category is
included as a placebo to test if survey respondents respond to any award category even
when it does not reflect any of their preference dimensions.
Community outreach is an award for students who excel in activities that have
broader social impact beyond the university campus. Participants in these activities
gain hands-on experience and develop skills for problem solving. Recipients of this
award typically include students who are involved in community service programs or
apply their classroom knowledge to real-world problem solving, and they are generally
considered to be more competent. Moreover, many community outreach programs on
campus – especially those that are more likely to be recognized with an award – are
sponsored by the university under the guidance of the CCP committee and the Chinese
Communist Youth League (CCYL). These programs are part of the party’s effort to
co-opt social activism among students. Students who choose to participate in these
programs demonstrate a higher degree of willingness to work within the current social
and political framework than those who choose to launch their independent initiatives.
This award, therefore, signals loyalty as well as competence.
Academic excellence is awarded to students who perform exceptionally in academic
work. Since academic merit is an indicator of intellectual capacity and learning ability,
this award signals competence.
Student leadership is awarded to students who have rendered excellent service in
their capacity as student leaders on campus. Recipients are usually leaders of student
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union or the CCYL in the university, who not only display outstanding leadership
quality in their service but also assist the university in managing student affairs under
the guidance of the CCP committee. This award is thus a signal of both competence
and loyalty.
6. Prior Work Experience: The three values in this attribute are no experience, com-
pany job, and government job. Work experience generally represents human capital ac-
cumulation where an individual develops professional skills. Government job is hence
a signal of competence. To the extent that skills are heterogeneous and not always
transferable, work experience at a company job does not necessarily signal competence
for a civil service job; it is included as a placebo as well as to make the survey more
realistic for respondents.
7. Father’s Occupation: Unlike the previous six attributes that represent some intrinsic
qualities of a candidate (i.e. competence and/or loyalty), this attribute is intended to
reflect a candidate’s political connections as a result of his or her family background.
Kinship ties is possibly among the strongest kinds of personal connection; having
kinship ties to political insiders is hence a clear signal of political connections. The
four values included are private sector worker, SOE worker (CCP member), private
entrepreneur, and government official.
Government official is a strong signal of political connections, relative to the ref-
erence category private sector worker. Having a father who is a government official
clearly indicates that the candidate is connected to the political elite class.
In addition, two other values, SOE worker (CCP) member and private entrepreneur,
are included as placebos to test possible causal mechanisms of political connections on
NCSE recruitment. If political connections serve as a cue of a candidate’s loyalty to
the regime, we would expect SOE worker (CCP) member to have similar functions. If
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political connections influence selection because of the strong social networks possessed
by the candidate, we would expect private entrepreneur to have similar effect as well.
2. Survey Implementation
The conjoint survey experiment was approved by the Columbia University Institutional
Review Board under protocol IRB-AAAP6302. It was implemented between August and
November in 2015. The survey was administered both online and offline, using different
methodologies. The content and layout of the survey was kept consistent in both forms.
Figure 3.6 shows an example of the survey design in the original Chinese language.
2.1 Online Administration
The online survey was hosted on www.qualtrics.com. A short URL to the survey was cre-
ated to be shared via the Chinese mobile application WeChat. To disseminate the survey,
the author’s professional and personal contacts who are known government officials were
contacted and asked to participate in the survey on their mobile phones. In addition, they
were asked to share the survey exclusively with their colleagues at work and invite them
to take the survey. As a measure to ensure that all respondents to the online survey were
government employees, the author’s contacts were specifically asked not to disseminate the
survey further via their colleagues. The online survey was also sent to the author’s profes-
sional contacts who are journalists and university researchers to be shared with their contacts
and friends who are government officials.
77
Figure 3.6: Design of Conjoint Table & Questions (Original Version in Chinese)
 1 







第一组   
    考生  1 考生  2 
在校荣誉 学习标兵 优秀学生干部 
父亲职业 政府官员 私企普通员工 
基层经验 无 (应届毕业生) 基层行政工作 
政治面貌 中共党员 中共党员 
毕业院校 985重点高校 普通地方院校 
性别 女 男 
教育程度 硕士研究生 大学本科 
 
1a. 您更倾向挑选谁？ 
 考生 1  考生 2  
 
1b. 您是否认为上述两名考生适合并胜任公务员工作？ 
      请为他们打分。1代表完全不适合、不胜任；5代表非常适合、非常胜任。 
 1 2 3 4 5 
考生 1      
考生 2      
 
1c. 请为他们在今后工作中的领导力打分。1代表完全没能力；5代表非常有能力。 
 1 2 3 4 5 
考生 1      
考生 2      
 
1d. 请为他们在今后工作中的执行力打分。1代表完全没能力；5代表非常有能力。 
 1 2 3 4 5 
考生 1      
考生 2      
  
78
The recruitment method for online survey subjects, as described above, was not a snow-
ball approach. All respondents were either a known contact of the author or a known contact
of the author’s contact. This approach was adopted as a way to make sure that all potential
respondents were verifiable government employees. As an additional measure, the survey
included in its demographic background section one question that asked the respondent
to report the nature of his or her workplace. Employees of non-government sectors were
subsequently removed from the sample.
The recruitment method for online survey subjects, as described above, was not a snow-
ball approach. All respondents were either a known contact of the author or a known contact
of the author’s contact. This approach was adopted as a way to make sure that all potential
respondents were verifiable government employees. As an additional measure, the survey
included in its demographic background section one question that asked the respondent
to report the nature of his or her workplace. Employees of non-government sectors were
subsequently removed from the sample.
In total, 121 online responses were returned, of which eight were incomplete. Among
them, 7 responses were blank, indicating that they may have been created by accident (e.g.
clicking on the URL by mistake or unintentional duplicates); only one response was half
filled, suggesting that the respondent decided to leave the survey halfway. The attrition rate
(i.e. one out of over a hundred), therefore, is low. The eight incomplete responses were
subsequently removed, leaving 113 valid online responses for analysis.
2.2 Offline Administration
The conjoint survey was also implemented offline using paper questionnaires. The survey
was administered in five cities in China.9 Recruitment of survey respondents took advantage
of the fact that local universities in these cities regularly hosted cadre training workshops
and/or Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs that were attended by government
9To protect the human subjects in the experiment, the names of the cities are not disclosed.
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officials exclusively.
Professors teaching these workshops and programs were contacted in advance with a re-
quest to conduct the survey in their classes. Permissions were granted after each professor
had learned the content and purpose of the survey. The classroom setting offered an op-
portunity to access a large number of government officials at once. In addition, respondents
appeared to be more relaxed than they otherwise would be in a work setting.
Implementation of the survey in each classroom typically took about 15 to 20 minutes,
usually during the break time of a class. Each respondent filled out his or her survey
questionnaire independently and returned it to the numerator. Out of all students in these
classes, only three declined to participate; the rest were cooperative. Some respondents
left unprompted, hand-written remarks on the paper questionnaires that discussed their
preference and decision-making when choosing candidates, and a few others approached the
numerator afterwards to share their thoughts. This is evidence that respondents were candid
and willing to express their opinion during the survey. In total, 219 valid responses were
collected from offline survey implementation.
3. Data Description
Since the survey was not conducted using a probability sample, a detailed description of the
data is necessary to determine whether, and to what degree, the experiment has any external
validity.
3.1 Geographical Representation
Roughly two thirds of the responses are from the offline portion of the sample, which was
collected from five cities in China. Although the cities were not selected at random, together
they exhibit a considerable degree of heterogeneity in terms of a geographical location,
political stature, administrative rank, and level of economic development.
• Geographical location: Among the five cities, two are inland and three are coastal.
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Each city is located in a different province or municipality.
• Political stature/administrative rank: All five cities are large urban centers in
China, but there is some variation in terms of their rank and political importance.
One of the cities is a province-level municipality; two are provincial capitals that enjoy
a sub-provincial rank; the fourth city is the largest in the province and also enjoys a
sub-provincial rank; and the fifth city is an important economic power house in the
province and has a prefectural rank.
• Economic development: Although none of the five cities are located in the undevel-
oped area in China, they vary considerably in terms of level of economic development.
The provinces where they each are located are ranked between the 2nd and 14th among
all 31 provinces in terms of GDP per capita in 2015.
The online portion of the sample covers more localities in China. By matching respon-
dents’ IP addresses to geo-locations, it is found that 30 cities in 16 provinces are represented.
As shown in Figure 3.7, the survey sites – both online and offline – are spread all over the
country and there is significant degree of variation in terms of geographical location, admin-
istrative rank and level of economic development. To the extent that government officials
are heterogeneous across the types of cities they work in, the sample collected here accounts
for that heterogeneity. The results in this survey should thus bear external validity beyond
the respondents themselves.
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Figure 3.7: Cities Represented in Survey
Note: This map shows the geographical locations where the survey experiment was im-
plemented. To protect the human subjects of the survey, the names of the cities are not
disclosed, nor are they identified as online or offline survey sites.
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3.2 Respondent Characteristics
Due to the different recruitment methods used in online and offline implementation, it is
imperative to check if the two groups of respondents in the sample exhibit similar demo-
graphic characteristics. In juxtaposition, it is found that the online group is slightly older
and more senior in rank and leadership position than the offline group (see Table 3.3). This
is expected, as MPA programs are mostly attended by younger government cadres who hope
to advance their career by getting a postgraduate degree. The online implementation also
targeted more senior government official.
One concern with the sample is that it may suffer from several unobserved selection biases.
One possible selection bias is that government officials who agreed to participate in the survey
might be different from those who declined. Though there is no way to formally test for this
bias, the low attrition rate in both online and offline implementation, as discussed earlier,
gives some confidence regarding the representativeness of the sample. Another possible bias
is that government officials who attend cadre training workshops and MPA programs might
be different from those who do not. This concern is warranted, but it should be noted that
only government officials of a certain rank or above are eligible to attend cadre training
workshops and that those enrolled in MPA programs are often hopeful of future promotions.
In other words, these are government officials who are more likely to have authorities over
personnel selection in their work units. Given that this study is interested in understanding
how selection decisions are made by political elites in the government, this bias in the sample
does not hurt the validity of the results.
Lastly, I check the balance of attribute values to make sure that randomization was done
properly in this survey experiment. As shown in Table 3.4, not only are the attribute values
evenly distributed across the sample, they are also balanced across respondent characteristics.
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Table 3.3: Respondent Characteristics by Sample Subgroup
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Offline Sample
male 219 .539 .499 0 1
age 208 32.6 8.28 22 56
CCP membership 219 .827 .379 0 1
bureaucratic rank 215 1.53 .924 1 5
leadership position 216 .227 .419 0 1
interviewer experience 217 .198 .399 0 1
Online Sample
male 113 .655 .476 0 1
male 106 41.0 9.70 22 59
CCP membership 113 .796 .403 0 1
bureaucratic rank 108 2.97 1.48 1 6
leadership position 112 .438 .496 0 1
interviewer experience 112 .268 .443 0 1
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Table 3.4: Balance of Attribute Values
Means of Respondent Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Attributes Values Obs. male age CCP rank leader interview
Gender
Female 1,621 .587 35.4 .810 2.01 .297 .214
Male 1,699 .570 35.4 .822 2.01 .301 .230
Political Affiliation
None 1,601 .573 35.6 .802 2.05 .307 .215
CCP Member 1,719 .583 35.2 .830 1.98 .291 .228
College Attended
General College 1,694 .570 35.6 .817 2.02 .310 .212
Elite University 1,626 .587 35.1 .815 1.99 .287 .232
Education Level
Bachelor Degree 1,640 .585 35.6 .815 2.01 .312 .226
Master Degree 1,680 .571 35.2 .817 2.01 .286 .217
Award Won in College
No Award 690 .584 35.4 .799 1.98 .304 .234
Artistic Talent 651 .584 34.8 .796 2.03 .303 .208
Community Outreach 631 .597 35.8 .834 2.06 .309 .232
Academic Excellence 687 .568 36.0 .822 1.97 .287 .213
Student Leadership 661 .560 35.0 .832 2.01 .293 .223
Prior Work Experience
No Experience 1,135 .583 35.4 .827 2.06 .311 .240
Company Job 1,111 .584 35.3 .815 1.98 .296 .210
Government Job 1,074 .567 35.5 .806 1.99 .288 .214
Father’s Occupation
Private Sector Worker 809 .583 35.4 .818 1.99 .296 .215
SOE Worker (CCP Member) 848 .575 35.8 .807 2.05 .316 .211
Private Entrepreneur 852 .588 35.7 .843 2.04 .307 .251
Government Official 811 .566 34.7 .797 1.95 .276 .209
Note: This table reports the number of observations for each candidate attribute value (column 1),
as well as the means of respondent characteristics for each attribute value, including respondent’s
gender, age, CCP membership, bureaucratic rank, leadership position, and interviewer experience
(columns 2-7). As shown, attributes are well balanced in the sample and across all respondent
characteristics.
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Table 3.5: Estimated AMCEs on Choice Outcome and Rating Outcome
(1) (2)
Prob. of Being Selected “Suitable & Qualified”
Gender
Female 0 0
Male .0650 (.0192)∗∗∗ .0323 (.0366)
Political Affiliation
None 0 0
CCP Member .0793 (.0187)∗∗∗ .0623 (.0384)
College Attended
General College 0 0
Elite University .115 (.0189)∗∗∗ .179 (.0345)∗∗∗
Education Level
Bachelor Degree 0 0
Master Degree .0487 (.0174)∗∗∗ .100 (.0358)∗∗∗
Award Won in College
No Award 0 0
Artistic Talent .0189 (.0309) .0744 (.0592)
Community Outreach .201 (.0290)∗∗∗ .273 (.0507)∗∗∗
Academic Excellence .0914 (.0274)∗∗∗ .147 (.0552)∗∗∗
Student Leadership .234 (.0286)∗∗∗ .275 (.0544)∗∗∗
Prior Work Experience
No Experience 0 0
Company Job .0129 (.0215) .0563 (.0432)
Government Job .158 (.0227)∗∗∗ .199 (.0461)∗∗∗
Father’s Occupation
Private Sector Worker 0 0
SOE worker (CCP Member) -.00290 (.0315) -.0130 (.0506)
Private Entrepreneur .00310 (.0306) -.0602 (.0470)
Government Official .217 (.0285)∗∗∗ .178 (.0486)∗∗∗
Obs. 2958 2813
Note: Column (1) reports AMCE estimates on the probability of being selected for the
civil service job (i.e. choice outcome); column (2) reports AMCE estimates on the rating
of being “suitable and qualified” for the civil service job (i.e. a rating outcome). Estimates
are based on the benchmark OLS model; standard errors clustered at the respondent level
are shown in parentheses.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reigning in Elite Behavior in Recruitment
In many ways, the findings in Chapter 3 should not come as a surprise. Although local elites
are allies of the central government and share its interest in recruiting the best and brightest
individuals into the government, they are also motivated by more immediate, private interests
to choose those with personal connections to the government. Simply put, their utility
function is different from that of the top leaders in the central government. Consequently,
it is unrealistic, or at least unpragmatic, for the central government to try to realign local
elites’ preference with its own with it comes to elite recruitment.
However, although the central government cannot change local elites’ inherent preference,
it can alter their behavior during recruitment by imposing enforceable constraints. In other
words, as long as elites are not able or not allowed to act on their patronage-based preference,
they will make decisions that are more merit-based and in line with the regime’s preference.
Indeed, constraining elite behavior constitutes a large part of the continued evolution of
NCSE. By introducing a series of supporting legislations and regulations in addition to the
Civil Service Law, the central government has imposed an increasing number of institutional
constraints on elites to regulate their behavior during NCSE.1
1See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion.
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In this chapter, I investigate whether these institutional constraints in fact promotes
meritocracy in NCSE. Specifically, I conducted an original government official survey to
understand elite behavior during recruitment and whether institutional constraints have
been effective at altering their behavior.
1. Empirical Strategy
A Government Official Survey
Between November 2014 and July 2015, I conducted a nationwide government official survey
in collaboration with the School of Social Science at Tsinghua University in China. To gain
an in-depth understanding of local elites’ attitude and opinion on NCSE, I designed a battery
of questions – both descriptive and experimental – on the topic of civil service recruitment.
One particular objective of the survey is to assess whether the institutional constraints in
NCSE and its norm of meritocracy are effective at reducing local elites’ patronage behavior
during recruitment. In other words, I want to find out if NCSE promotes merit-based
selection by reigning in elites’ divergent preference.
Ideally, to estimate the causal effect of NCSE institutional constraints, we would need
panel data on elite behavior both before and after the constraints were imposed. In reality,
however, the constraints have been put in place for some years and there is no systematic
record of elite behavior during recruitment. To overcome this problem, I resort to a second-
best identification strategy, which is to compare the behavior of two groups of elites who
differ on how constrained they are by institutional rules in NCSE.
One important question asked in the survey was how a respondent entered the govern-
ment; specifically, it identified whether a respondent joined the civil service by taking and
passing the NCSE. This particular respondent characteristic is critical, as it differentiates
respondents who have experienced NCSE firsthand as a candidate from those who have not.
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Since those who have personally undergone the process of NCSE selection have a much bet-
ter understanding of the built-in institutional constraints and the disciplinary actions they
would receive for violating the constraints, it is reasonable to argue that local elites who
joined the government via NCSE feel more constrained by its institutional rules than their
colleagues who joined the government via some other paths. Furthermore, since the mode of
recruitment – NCSE or otherwise – was not up to individual government officials when they
first joined the government, there is no self-selection bias. In other words, individual elites’
awareness of institutional constraints in NCSE is not determined by their other personal
traits but exogenously by higher-level government policies.
Having identified the two groups of survey respondents varying in terms of their awareness
of NCSE institutional constraints, I designed and implemented a list experiment in the
survey to uncover local elites’ true preference for patronage-based recruitment and investigate
whether NCSE institutional constraints help reduce such preference. Next, I describe the
list experiment in more detail.
A List Experiment
In Chapter 3, I employ a conjoint experiment to show that local elites, when unconstrained
during recruitment, exhibit a privately motivated preference for candidates with political
connections. In this experiment, I continue to investigate the influence of candidates’ political
connections and whether institutional constraints in NCSE has any effect in reducing it.
To elicit truthful answers from respondents regarding their attitude towards candidates’
political connections during elite recruitment, I employ the unmatched count technique
(UCT), also known as the list experiment(Ahart and Sackett 2004; Coutts and Jann 2011).
One advantage of the list experiment is that it is easy to administer. Since respondents
are not obligated to admit to engaging in any particular sensitive activity, they can reveal
critical information without fear.
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In the survey, respondents were randomly assigned into three groups of equal size: one
control group and two treatment groups. All respondents were asked a question similar
to the one in the conjoint experiment. It begins with a scenario description that puts the
respondent in the position of an NCSE interviewer.
Question: Imagine that you are serving as an NCSE interviewer to recruit new
civil servants on behalf of your work unit. How many of the items below about
a candidate are key factors that influence your decision? You only need to give
the number of key factors; you do not need to enumerate which one(s).
1. education and academic major
2. political affiliation
3. local work experience
4. treatment item: political connections or interpersonal skills
For respondents in the control group, they were only given the first three items on the
list. For the two treatment groups, respondents were given a fourth item in addition to the
three given to the control group: those in Group 1 were given a treatment item of “political
connections” and those in Group 1 were given a treatment item of “interpersonal skills.”
Although my primary interest is in the treatment of political connections, the treatment
of interpersonal skills is helpful as it serves as a placebo and a reference point. Similar to
political connections, interpersonal skills are hard to quantify but highly valued as a soft
asset in government. Incorporating the second treatment of interpersonal skills allows me to
validate the list experiment in several ways: first, it helps reveal whether survey respondents
were cognizant and responsive to different treatment items; second, it provides a point of
reference that gives us a better sense of the relative importance of political connections in
NCSE recruitment.
The specific wording of this question is particularly suited for the identification strat-
egy, where I differentiate respondents who took NCSE themselves from those who did not.
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Since the question is based on a scenario and asks respondents how they would imagine
themselves to react, their response reflects how relevant they perceive each given item to
be (instead of how inherently important), which can be directly influenced by NCSE insti-
tutional constraints. For instance, candidates’ political connections might be important to
a survey respondent who has taken NCSE himself; however, his personal experience with
NCSE has taught him that interviewers are not provided with information on candidates’
personal background, including their political connections, and that various policies have
been introduced to prohibit interaction between interviewers and candidates. As a result,
even if the respondent attaches some importance to candidates’ political connections, he
is more likely to consider this factor irrelevant in the context of NCSE, as compared to a
respondent who does not have personal experience with NCSE and hence is less aware of the
institutional constraints.
As a measure of robustness check, the survey poses an additional question to the con-
trol group exclusively, which directly asks respondents to name the key factors influencing
recruitment decisions from the list of five items (i.e., education and academic major, po-
litical affiliation, local work experience, political connections, and interpersonal skills). If
candidates’ political connections and interpersonal skills are indeed sensitive items that suf-
fer from social desirability bias, we would expect a smaller proportion of respondents to
response positively on them in this question when compared to that in the list experiment
question.
Additionally, to better understand what local elites value – or what they believe they are
expected to value – in candidates during civil service recruitment, the survey includes a third
question asking, “What do you believe are the key criteria in the civil service recruitment?
Please rank the top three in the order of importance.” The items provided include exam
performance, political affiliation, education background, political connections, and local work
experience.
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Together, these questions are aimed at eliciting government officials’ opinion regard-
ing candidates’ political connections in elite recruitment. The list experiment question is
designed to reveal respondents’ decision-making behavior, especially whether they take can-
didates’ political connections into account. I argue that their behavior can be altered by
the institutional constraints in NCSE, especially those that make getting information on
candidates’ political connections difficult, impossible, or illegal. In other words, while local
elites may still hold on to their preference for candidates’ with political connections, the
institutional rules of NCSE make them disregard this consideration or weakens its influence.
Therefore, using the list experiment, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Government officials who have personal experience with NCSE are
less likely to consider candidates’ political connections an important factor in
NCSE.
In the next section, I discuss the survey data and results from the list experiment.
2. Analysis
Data
The government official survey was fielded between November 2014 and July 2015. It covered
26 cities in eight provinces in China, and surveyed over 1,600 government officials working in
different parts of the government. Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics on respondent
characteristics.
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Table 4.1: Government Official Survey: Respondent Characteristics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
male 1,604 0.5953865 0.4909702 0 1
age 1,572 37.04771 8.215332 21 66
CCP membership 1,604 0.7811721 0.4135806 0 1
college degree 1,604 0.80798 0.3940115 0 1
leadership position 1,604 0.2568579 0.4370366 0 1
bureaucratic rank 1,553 2.224082 1.165444 1 6
entered via NCSE 1,604 0.532419 0.4991035 0 1
Slightly over half of the respondents joined the government via NCSE, which renders the
sample balanced over the key independent variable in the analysis. Moreover, as a result
of full randomization, respondent characteristics are also highly balanced across control and
treatment groups (see Table 4.3 in appendix). This allows us to conduct the list experiment
without concerns about selection bias.
Before analyzing the list experiment question, we first take a look at the other two
questions concerning the influence of candidates’ political connections in recruitment. When
asked to name the three most important criteria in civil service recruitment, only 12.5% of
the respondents mention candidates’ political connection; in contrast, 83% mention exam
performance and 73.5% mention local work experience (see Table 4.4). In addition, only
11.5% of the respondents in the control group identify candidates’ political connection as
a key factor influencing their decision in recruitment. The low percentages of respondents
choosing political connections suggest that government officials understand that NCSE is
supposed to be merit-based and patronage should not be a relevant factor in elite recruitment.
A Trend towards Meritocracy
Although local elites are generally cognizant of the meritocratic nature of NCSE, they may
be motivated by private interests to behave differently when making recruitment decisions.
To estimate how many engage in patronage practice, we turn to analyze the list experiment.
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Given the fully randomized survey design, respondent characteristics are highly balanced
across different groups (see Table 4.3). The difference in means for each treatment group,
therefore, indicates the proportion of government officials who consider the treatment a key
factor in recruitment.
Table 4.2: Effects of Different Candidate Attributes on NCSE Recruitment
treatment groups
control group political interpersonal
connections skills
(1) (2) (3)
mean 1.967 2.314 2.437
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
difference in means 0.347∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052)
observations 544 526 503
Note: This table reports the mean value of number of key factors that influence
recruitment for the control and treatment groups in the list experiment, respec-
tively. The difference in means for each treatment group is relative to the control
group.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.2 reports the results of the difference-in-means test between the treatment and
control groups. On average, respondents in the control group consider 1.967 of the three
given items as key factors in recruitment, whereas respondents in the treatment group of
political connections consider 2.314 of the four given items as key factors and those in the
treatment group of interpersonal skills consider 2.437 of the four given items as key factors.
The difference in means is 0.347 for political connections and 0.470 for interpersonal skills;
both are highly statistically significant. It means that 34.7% and 47% of the respondents, re-
spectively, take into serious account candidates’ political connections and their interpersonal
skills when making recruitment decisions in NCSE.
The widely acknowledged importance of interpersonal skills in NCSE recruitment is not
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surprising. After all, much work in government depends on effective interpersonal commu-
nication and management. It is quite remarkable, however, that more than one third of
the respondents attach great importance to candidates’ political connections. This is far
more than the 12.5% and 11.5% of respondents, respectively, in the previous two questions
who consider candidates’ political connections an important factor. The large discrepancy
between the list experiment and direct survey questions once again demonstrates that, al-
though government officials are conscious that they should not engage in patronage-based
recruitment, a significant portion of them still do so nonetheless.
The results of the difference-in-means test largely corroborate with the findings from the
conjoint experiment. However, is this behavior uniform across different groups? Do local
elites behave differently as a result of having personal experience with NCSE?
To test the hypothesis, I examine if the group of respondents who have personally taken
NCSE behave differently from the group of respondents who did not take NCSE. I employ
a series of estimation methods to compare the proportion of respondents in each group who
consider political connections a key factor. The results are reported in Figure 4.1.
First, I estimate the proportions without controlling for respondent-level covariates (columns
1 and 2). Next, to make sure that the difference in proportions between the two groups is
not driven by any respondent characteristics (i.e., for instance, the NCSE group is overall
younger than the non-NCSE group), I estimate the proportions controlling for respondent
characteristics including gender, age, CCP membership, college degree, and leadership posi-
tion. In addition to an OLS estimator (column 3), I employ two more efficient estimators,
the nonlinear least squares and the maximum likelihood estimators (columns 4 and 5) (Imai
2011). Regardless of estimation methods and model specifications, the results show that
the NCSE group attach significantly less importance to candidates’ political connections in
recruitment.
100
Figure 4.1: Heterogeneous Importance of Political Connections in NCSE
Note: This plot shows the estimated proportions of respondents who consider political con-
nections a key factor in recruitment, based on different estimation methods. Each solid
square, solid triangle, and solid circle represent the estimated proportion for the non-NCSE
group, the NCSE group, and the difference between the two proportions, respectively. The
solid lines represent the 95% asymptotic confidence intervals.
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This difference in proportion demonstrates that government officials who have had per-
sonal experience with merit-based recruitment in NCSE are significantly less likely to consider
non-merit factors when they are making recruitment decisions. This does not necessarily
mean that they are morally more upright or have preferences more closely aligned with the
central government. It is more likely that their own experience makes them more aware and
observant of the institutional constraints in NCSE that prevent non-meritocratic practice.
While this list experiment does not directly investigate the reason why local elites who
joined the government via NCSE are less likely to engage in patronage-based recruitment,
the findings suggest that, as the government is filled with increasing numbers of civil servants
who join the ranks through a merit-based process, local elites overall become more compliant
with the meritocratic principle in recruitment.
In addition to exploring the criteria used by local elites in civil service recruitment, the
survey also includes a battery of questions regarding respondents’ opinion on NCSE and the
civil service in general. In particular, respondents were asked to rate the different aspects of
civil service management by the local government on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 for “very bad” and
5 for “very good”). As illustrated in Figure 4.2, government officials are most positive in
their evaluation of civil service recruitment: the two items on NCSE – for being meritocratic
and being open and fair, respectively – receive average scores above 4, the highest among
all items. In comparison, other aspects of civil service management receive significantly
lower scores, most of them below 3.5. Although these ratings are not the most objective
evaluation, it is quite remarkable that there is a consensus inside the government that NCSE
is meritocratic as well as open and fair.
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In this chapter, I estimate the effectiveness of NCSE institutional constraints on reducing
patronage behavior by local elites. Employing a list experiment conducted among over
1,600 government officials, I find that a significant portion of them still consider candidates’
political connections an important factor in elite recruitment. However, when I compare
the group of respondents who have taken NCSE themselves to join the government with
the group who have not taken NCSE, I find that the former attach much less importance to
candidates’ political connections, since they are more aware of and hence feel more subjected
to the institutional constraints, given their personal experience with NCSE. It indicates
that, as local elites become more subjected to institutional constraints in NCSE, they are
less likely to exert their personal preference for non-merit factors during recruitment. The
survey results also suggest that government officials believe that NCSE implementation is
satisfactory, especially when compared to other aspect of civil service management, and the
recruitment system is overall meritocratic as well as open and fair.
The findings in this chapter demonstrate that, as NCSE becomes more institutionalized,
it becomes more effective in reducing the influence of patronage and promoting merit-based
selection. The meritocratic nature of NCSE, in turn, would change ordinary citizens’ per-
ception of their upward mobility and their attitude towards the regime, which are the topics
to be examined in the next chapter.
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Appendix
Table 4.3: Respondent Characteristics by Treatment Status
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Control Group
male 550 0.591 0.492 0 1
age 537 37.2 8.071 22 60
CCP membership 550 0.785 0.411 0 1
college degree 550 0.833 0.374 0 1
leadership position 550 0.251 0.434 0 1
bureaucratic rank 530 2.234 1.169 1 6
entered via NCSE 550 0.551 0.498 0 1
Treatment Group 1: Political Connections
male 538 0.584 0.493 0 1
age 525 36.7 8.475 22 66
CCP membership 538 0.775 0.418 0 1
college degree 538 0.805 0.397 0 1
leadership position 538 0.257 0.437 0 1
bureaucratic rank 521 2.177 1.160 1 6
entered via NCSE 538 0.561 0.497 0 1
Treatment Group 2: Interpersonal Skills
male 516 0.612 0.488 0 1
age 510 37.3 8.095 21 66
CCP membership 516 0.783 0.413 0 1
college degree 516 0.785 0.411 0 1
leadership position 516 0.264 0.441 0 1
bureaucratic rank 502 2.63 1.168 1 6
entered via NCSE 516 0.483 0.500 0 1
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Table 4.4: Importance of Various Candidate Attributes in Recruitment
candidate attribute most second most third most top three
important important important (sum)
exam performance 0.544 0.151 0.136 0.830
political affiliation 0.079 0.161 0.158 0.398
education background 0.127 0.316 0.252 0.695
political connections 0.019 0.054 0.053 0.125
local work experience 0.188 0.257 0.291 0.735
Note: The first three columns in this table report the proportions of respondents who con-
sider each of the candidate attributes “the most important,” “the second most important,”
and “the third most important” criterion in civil service recruitment. The last column sums
the proportions in the first three columns and reports the proportions of respondents who




Co-Opting with Upward Mobility
By introducing the NCSE and buttressing its enforcement with necessary laws and regu-
lations, the CCP has effectively established an institution of merit-based elite recruitment
that is open to a large segment of the population. College-educated youths between the age
of 18 and 35, regardless of their family background and political connections, now have a
chance to get a job in the government and move up the socioeconomic ladder based on their
talent and hard work. While the number of individuals who eventually succeed in getting
into the government is relatively small, the regularly held exam offers a prized opening for
millions of young people. How does the presence of an additional career opportunity affect
their personal upward mobility chances? Does it have any influence on their socioeconomic
preference? And, ultimately, what are the political implications for the CCP regime?
In this chapter, I put my main argument to test, which is that NCSE enhances the
perception of upward mobility among those who are eligible to participate. Whether or not
they choose to take the exam or are eventually successful in it, the much touted fair and
transparent process of NCSE helps forge a belief in them that, if they put in the necessary
effort, they would have a good chance of becoming regime insiders. This optimism also shapes
their distributive preference: since they now have a better prospect of upward mobility,
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they prefer less income redistribution in the regime. The enhanced prospect of personal
betterment through individual effort, coupled with dampened preference for redistribution,
makes college-educated youths much less of a threat to regime stability. By establishing a
merit-based elite recruitment system, CCP effectively co-opts a significant segment of the
society – those who are highly capable of dissent and opposition – with upward mobility.
Using data from a national representative survey, I employ a generalized difference-in-
differences framework to examine the effect of NCSE on college-educated youths’ perception
of upward mobility and their distributive preference. Additionally, using data from a col-
lege student survey, I explore the causal mechanism through which NCSE affects individual
perception of upward mobility.
1. Empirical Strategy
A Difference-in-Differences Framework
To estimate the effect of NCSE on public perception and attitude, I focus on the exams
administered by provinces rather than the central government. As described in Chapter
1, the institution of NCSE largely consists of two parallel parts – the “national exam”
administered by the central government for positions in national ministries and department,
and the “provincial exam” administered by each province for positions in the four local
levels of government under its jurisdiction. Between the two, although some may consider
the national exam more prestigious, it offers a much smaller number of positions each year
than the number of positions in provincial exams combined.1 Moreover, it is more realistic for
the majority of applicants to work in the locality of their origin instead of going to Beijing.
As a result, provincial exams are often a more viable and hence more popular choice for
1For example, based on incomplete statistics compiled from media reports, in 2009, after all 30 mainland
provinces had introduced the NCSE, the combined number of local government positions from 22 provinces
was 100,989, whereas the number of central government positions was 13,566.
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college-educated youths.
By focusing on the provincial exams, I am able to take advantage of the fact that NCSE
was introduced by individual provinces in a staggered fashion over the span of several years.
Instead of all provinces introducing NCSE at the same time after the central government
called for the adoption of the principle of fanjin bikao (“all entries via exam”) in civil service
recruitment, some implemented it as early as in 1999, whereas others did so a few years
later. Once a province adopted the fanjin bikao principle, it must fill all new government
positions via NCSE, resulting in a sharp increase in career opportunities in the civil service
for the eligible public.
To determine when NCSE was implemented in each province, I use an online database of
laws and government regulations in China (http://www.pkulaw.cn/) to research all publicly
released government documents by each province on the topic of civil service recruitment.
Since I am interested in the sharp increase in government job opportunities available for
open competition, I look for the phrase fanjin bikao and use the date of its first appearance
in each province’s official documents as the year when NCSE was fully implemented in that
province. Figure 5.1 shows the year of NCSE introduction in each province.
Given the age requirement in NCSE (i.e., 35 years old or younger), its staggered imple-
mentation at the province level means that college-educated individuals of the same birth co-
hort may have been eligibility to apply and compete for government jobs in certain provinces
but not in others, depending on their locality of residence. The resultant province-cohort
variation determined if a college-educate person was eligible to take advantage of the sharp
increase in government career opportunities once NCSE was implemented.
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Figure 5.1: Year of NCSE Introduction at Province Level
Note: This map shows the year of NCSE introduction for each Chinese province.
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Exploiting the province-cohort variation, I employ a generalized difference-in-differences
(DID) design to examine whether there is any difference in perception of upward mobility be-
tween the group of college-educated individuals who became eligible to apply for government
jobs as a result of NCSE introduction and the other group of college-educated individuals
who could not qualify because of the age requirement.
2. Data
For the main analysis, I use data from the four latests waves of the Chinese General Social
Survey (CGSS), conducted between 2010 and 2013. Since the last province to fully implement
NCSE did so in 2009, by incorporating data dating from 2010, I make sure that there is a
treatment group (i.e. individuals who became eligible to apply for civil service jobs as a
result of NCSE implementation) as well as a control group in every province.
One advantage of using the repeated cross-sectional data over using panel survey data
is the large sample size it offers by pooling together multiple waves. Since I am primarily
interested in college-educated individuals, who constitute a relatively small portion of the
population,2 it is important to use a set of data that offers a sufficiently sizable group of
college-educated respondents. By pooling four waves of CGSS data, I obtain a college-
educated sample of over 4,500 respondents who were between the age of 18 and 60 years old
at the time of survey.
Identifying Beneficiaries of NCSE
To identify respondents who were beneficiaries of NCSE introduction, I constructed a di-
chotomous variable, eligibility at introduction, as the main predictor. By matching each
2According to the official report from the 2010 National Census, published by the National Bureau of
Statistics, individuals with college education constitute 8.93% of the population; see http://www.stats.
gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/201104/t20110428_30327.html (accessed on June 9, 2017). A more
recent estimate from the official report of the 2015 1% National Population Sample Survey adjusts that statis-
tic to 12.45%; see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160420_1346151.html (accessed on
June 9, 2017).
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respondent’s province of residence to the NCSE introduction timetable (as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1), I can determine his or her age when NCSE was first implemented in the province
of his or her residence. Because there is a strict age eligibility requirement, those of age 35
or younger were eligible to take the exam for at least once and are hence coded as 1 for eli-
gibility at introduction; those older than 35 did not have any chance to become civil servants
via NCSE and are hence coded as 0. In other words, eligibility at introduction measures
whether a respondent was ever able to take advantage of the new elite recruitment system.
Even though not everyone who was eligible chose to take the exam or eventually succeeded
in it, they were offered an additional career opportunity; in contrast, those who missed the
age cutoff were not given an opportunity to pursue this career path at all. This variable,
therefore, allows me to explore whether the presence of an additional opportunity has any
effect on respondents’ perception of their upward mobility and distributive preference.
In addition, I construct a second dichotomous variable, current eligibility, which indicates
whether a respondent was still eligible to take NCSE at the time of the survey. Those who
were of age 35 years or younger at the time of the survey are coded as 1, and those older
than 35 are coded as 0. Since individuals who were still eligible to take NCSE enjoyed an
additional option, this may influence how they evaluate their upward mobility. This variable,
therefore, is used as a control in alternative model specifications.
Measuring Upward Mobility and Distributive Preference
To measure respondents’ perception of upward mobility, I make use of survey questions
that ask about respondents’ socioeconomic status rather than those that ask about their
personal or family income. Given that the prestige and advantages of being a regime insider
in China are often not directly measured in monetary terms – in fact, studies show that even
wealthy business owners in China seek to become regime insiders in order to boost their
business or protect it from expropriation (e.g., Truex 2014; Hou 2017) – survey questions on
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personal or family income do not sufficiently capture a respondent’s socioeconomic wellbeing
in the Chinese society.3 In particular, I use three questions that ask respondents to report
or estimate their socioeconomic status at various points of their lives. Each of the three
questions asks a respondent to place him- or herself in a ten-rung ladder that represents
different socioeconomic classes in a society, either at the time of the survey (i.e. current
status), ten years before the survey (i.e. past status), or ten years after the survey (i.e.
future status). Based on these questions, I construct two variables concerning a respondent’s
mobility: mobility experience and mobility prospect.
Mobility experience is calculated by taking the difference between a respondent’s current
status and past status; it measures the movement a respondent has made in terms of his
or her socioeconomic wellbeing over the past decade. Since a civil service job brings its
occupant both material benefits and social prestige, the introduction of NCSE is expected
to increase mobility experience, on average, for those who were eligible to apply.4
Similarly, mobility prospect is calculated by taking the difference between a respondent’s
future status and current status; it measures the movement a respondent expects to make
in terms of socioeconomic wellbeing in the next decade. Because the introduction of NCSE
presented an additional opportunity for those who were eligible at the time, they were
better positioned to make a career choice best suited for their ability and preference, which
could consequently lead to better mobility prospect in the future. Moreover, an individual’s
assessment of future mobility is partly shaped by his or her mobility trajectory in the past;
as such, those who stood to benefit from NCSE are expected to be more optimistic about
their future.
Besides the two indicators of upward mobility, I also examine respondents’ attitude to-
3In addition, questions on income suffer from large numbers of missing values.
4Although not everyone who were eligible took the exam, it is reasonable to argue that those who
regarded NCSE as the most efficient or suitable channel of upward mobility chose to take the exam and
some subsequently became civil servants. Even those who did not take the exam may still regard NCSE as
a viable alternative that helps increase their overall chance of upward mobility.
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ward income redistribution and whether NCSE has any effect on it. To measure redistribution
preference, I use the survey question that asks whether a respondent agrees with the follow-
ing statement: “We should tax the rich more to help the poor.” Responses are graded on a
scale of 1 to 5, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.5 Those who were eligible
for NCSE at the time of its introduction are expected to prefer less redistribution than those
who were not, since they enjoyed better mobility prospect.
Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables in
the data, as well as respondent characteristics.
Table 5.1: CGSS Data: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NCSE Eligibility
eligibility at introduction 4,595 0.814 0.389 0 1
current eligibility 4,595 0.585 0.493 0 1
Outcomes of Interest
mobility experience 4,575 0.702 1.486 -9 9
mobility prospect 4,013 1.527 1.458 -4 9
redistribution preference 2,654 3.421 0.985 1 5
Respondent Characteristics
male 4,595 0.520 0.500 0 1
Han ethnic 4,595 0.932 0.251 0 1
urban 4,595 0.872 0.334 0 1
CCP member 4,595 0.263 0.440 0 1
civil servant 4,595 0.079 0.270 0 1
parent in CCP 4,595 0.325 0.469 0 1
5This question was only asked in the 2010 and 2013 waves of CGSS. The sample size, consequently, is




To estimate the effects of NCSE, I apply a generalized difference-in-differences framework
to exploit the province-cohort variation in eligibility among college-educated individuals .
Since province-level NCSE was implemented over a span of several years, the 35-or-younger
age requirement creates a situation where individuals of the same birth cohort may or may
not have had the opportunity to apply for government jobs, depending on their province of
residence. I estimate the following regression,
yicps = βNCSEcp + Σγc + Σδp + θs + icp (5.1)
where yicps represents the outcome of interest of individual i of cohort c in province p surveyed
in year s; NCSEcp represents the independent variable, eligibility at introduction, for cohort
c in in province p; γc and δp are full sets of cohort and province fixed effects; θs capture the
survey year fixed effects; and icp represents any idiosyncratic differences that are correlated
across individuals within a province×cohort cell.
By using a difference-in-differences framework, the baseline model in Equation 5.1 allows
me to address a variety of concerns in identifying the effects of NCSE introduction. First,
province-level differences in economic development, overall upward mobility, income level,
and political culture may be correlated with individual experience and attitude regarding
upward mobility and redistribution. By controlling for province fixed effects, this model
exploits cross-cohort variation within each province as a result of staggered NCSE imple-
mentation. Similarly, cohort-level differences could lead to changes in individual attitude,
independent of NCSE; by including cohort fixed effects, this model is able to difference out
cross-cohort changes that occur even in the absence of NCSE implementation.
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In addition to the baseline model, I estimate additional specifications, including (1)
regressions controlling province×cohort-level covarites, (2) regressions controlling for for
individual-level covariates, and (3) regressions controlling for province-specific cohort fixed
effects.
Main Results
I begin the analysis by estimating the baseline difference-in-differences model. Instead of
pooling all respondents in two broad groups of treatment and control based on their age
at the time of NCSE introduction in their respective province of residence, I first examine
whether respondents’ perception and attitude vary depending on the “distance” between
their age and the NCSE eligibility cutoff (i.e., 35 years old). This enables me to explore
whether their perception and attitude vary with age even in the absence of NCSE, and
whether there is a sharp change following the NCSE introduction. I treat the group who
missed the age cutoff by just one year – those who were 36 years old at the time of NCSE
introduction – as the omitted category, and compare it with an older age group (age 37 and
above), the age group who just qualified to take the NCSE (age 35), and a younger age
group (age 34 and below) who were well eligible for the exam.
Figure 5.2 reports the coefficient estimates of dummy variables indicating each age group
with 90% confidence interval. The three plots in the top row report results based on regres-
sions using the full sample, encompassing all cohorts. To make sure that the estimates for
the oldest and youngest age groups are not driven by respondents on the far tails of the age
cohort distribution, I estimate the regressions again using only ten cohorts, five of which just
missed the NCSE age requirement (i.e. age 36 to 40), and the other five just qualified for it
(i.e. age 31 to 35); results of these regressions are reported in the three plots in the bottom
row. As shown, estimates from both rows are highly consistent.
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Note: Each of the figures shows the estimated effect of NCSE introduction by respondent age group with
90% confidence interval. Estimates are based on regressions of each outcome on cohort and province
fixed effects, as well as a set of dummy variables indicating age groups; standard errors are clustered
at the province×cohort level.
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For the outcome mobility experience, we observe a significant jump moving from the
age-ineligible groups to the age-eligible groups. In particular, compared to the age group of
36, the age group of 35 experienced significantly more upward movement in socioeconomic
status during the past ten years; a significant positive shift of similar scale is also seen in
younger age groups. In contrast, respondents older than 36 years old at the time of NCSE
introduction do not differ significantly in their mobility experience from the reference group.
A similar pattern is observed for the outcome mobility prospect in the middle column. In
the last column, on the outcome of redistribution preference, we do not observe a significant
immediate shift at the age cutoff, but younger groups do report a weaker preference for
income distribution even when the sample is limited to 10 cohorts; this is probably due to
their repeated chance of taking NCSE, which increases the likelihood of entering the political
elite class.
The patterns of coefficient estimates reported in Figure 5.2 show that there is no general
trend of change in perception or attitude based on respondent age. Specifically, we do not
observe any significant difference between those who missed the NCSE age cutoff by just
one year and those who were even older. We can also see that the outcomes are similar and
consistent across the age groups that were eligible to take NCSE, especially for outcomes
pertaining to perception of social mobility. This indicates that the sharp differences observed
across NCSE eligibility is not limited to only particular age groups.
Next, I estimate the standard difference-in-differences model in Equation 5.1, examining
differences between respondents who were eligible to take NCSE at least once and respon-
dents who were never eligible because of their age, controlling for province and cohort fixed
effects. Table 5.2 reports the coefficient estimates of respondent eligibility at the time of
NCSE introduction. For each outcome of interest, I estimate the model first using the full
sample of all cohorts (Panel A), then using samples of fewer cohorts around the 35-years-old
age cutoff (Panels B and C). Restricting the sample to fewer cohorts reduces imbalance of
118
Table 5.2: Effects of NCSE Eligibility
mobility mobility redistribution
experience prospect preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: full sample
eligibility at introduction 0.287∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗ -0.186∗
(0.088) (0.100) (0.100) (0.096) (0.097)
current eligibility 0.519∗∗∗ -0.052
(0.074) (0.079)
observations 4400 3839 3839 2539 2539
B: cohort bandwidth=(-10, 10)
eligibility at introduction 0.305∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ -0.171∗ -0.168
(0.092) (0.097) (0.099) (0.101) (0.103)
current eligibility 0.272∗∗ -0.014
(0.118) (0.127)
observations 1818 1405 1405 1047 1047
C: cohort bandwidth=(-5, 5)
eligibility at introduction 0.248∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.220∗ -0.199∗ -0.209∗
(0.109) (0.121) (0.117) (0.114) (0.117)
current eligibility 0.422 0.223
(0.563) (0.328)
observations 978 729 729 541 541
Note: All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects, as well as survey
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the province×cohort level are reported in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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respondent characteristic between the treatment and control groups and prevents coefficient
estimates from being driven by the youngest and oldest respondent in the full sample, thus
helping us to better isolate the effect of NCSE introduction.
Column (1) of Table 5.2 reports the estimated effect of NCSE introduction on respon-
dents’ mobility experience in the past ten years. Estimates in all three panels show that
individuals who were eligible for NCSE at the time of its introduction experienced greater
upward mobility than those who were not. It can be inferred that NCSE has enhanced the
perceived mobility experience for those who were eligible to take advantage of it. For this
group, the introduction of NCSE presented them with an additional opportunity to advance
their socioeconomic status; as a result, they have, on average, experienced greater upward
mobility.
Columns (2) and (3) report the estimated effect of NCSE introduction on respondents’
mobility prospect for the next ten years. Since this outcome concerns with respondents’
future prospect, which can be affected by whether they were still eligible to take NCSE at
the time of the survey, I control for current eligibility in column (3). As shown in all three
panels, eligibility at introduction has a significant, positive effect, indicating that those who
were eligible to take advantage of the new elite recruitment system are more optimistic about
their future mobility.
In addition, the positive coefficient estimates on current eligibility suggest that the pres-
ence of NCSE as a viable career path increases a respondent’s optimism about his or her
future mobility. The statistically insignificant estimate in Panel C is primarily a result of
extreme sample imbalance: by restricting the sample to respondents of age 31 to 40 at the
time of NCSE introduction in each province, we are left with only 15 respondents who were
currently eligible for NCSE at the time of the survey and more than 700 who were no longer
eligible.
Lastly, columns (4) and (5) report the estimated effect of NCSE introduction on respon-
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dents’ redistribution preference, with column (5) controlling for their current eligibility. The
significant, negative coefficient estimates on eligibility at introduction are largely consistent
and robust across different samples and model specifications, indicating that NCSE introduc-
tion has led to reduced preference for redistribution among those who were given additional
upward mobility opportunities.
Together, Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 present clear evidence that NCSE introduction has
a significant positive effect on individual upward mobility as perceived by those who were
eligible to take advantage of the new elite recruitment system. Although not all of them took
the exam or subsequently became civil servants, NCSE was a welcome addition as a channel
of upward mobility. On average, this group report greater upward movement in terms of
socioeconomic status, and they are more optimistic about their future mobility. Moreover,
they are less in favor of income redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Robustness Checks
(a) Balance of Respondent Characteristics
One potential concern with the difference-in-differences model used in the analysis, which
identifies the effect of NCSE using the arbitrary age cutoff, is that there could be imbalance
in respondent characteristics related to their age. Since those who were ineligible for NCSE
at the time of its introduction tend to be older (notwithstanding the varied implementation
time in different provinces), the control group overall may exhibit characteristics that are
distinct from the treatment group.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.3, I first present the mean respondent characteristics
for the control and treatment groups, respectively, as determined by the dummy variable
eligibility at introduction. In columns (3) and (4), I report the raw, unconditional differences
between the two groups and the p-values testing for their statistical significance. When we
examine the full sample (see Panel A), the two groups are significantly different in almost
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every aspect; however, as we restrict the sample to fewer cohorts around the NCSE intro-
duction date (see Panels B and C), the two groups become more similar. In Panel C with
only ten cohorts, the two groups are almost statistically indistinguishable; the balance in
characteristics here provides further justification for estimating the regressions using smaller
cohort bandwidths. The unconditional imbalance in the full sample, however, is to be ex-
pected. Since the respondents in the treatment group are overall younger, they tend to be
less male (as education investment in daughters has increased, thanks to the one-child policy
), less urban (as more rural students enrolled in universities), with fewer CCP members,
fewer civil servants and fewer with parents in CCP.
I then report, in columns (5) and (6), the differences in means conditional on province
and cohort fixed effects and the p-values testing for their statistical significance. As shown,
after taking into account the average characteristics of province and cohort, the two groups
become more similar and increasingly so as we narrow the cohort bandwidth. The remaining
differences in means will be addressed when I estimate an alternative model specification that
take into account individual-level characteristics (Table 5.6, Panel C).
(b) Placebo Test
Another concern with the model is that it might be partly capturing the effect of age when
it estimates the effect of NCSE eligibility. There is a case to be made that younger people
– who are more likely to be eligible for NCSE – tend to experience greater mobility and be
more optimistic about future mobility. To make sure that the model captures the effect of a
policy shock, i.e., NCSE introduction, rather than a general trend, I conduct a placebo test of
the baseline results by arbitrary shifting the NCSE implementation date in every province by
5 years forward and backward, respectively; correspondingly, respondents’ eligibility status
was adjusted based on their age at the new implementation date. If there is no genuine shock
effect of NCSE introduction, I except the coefficient estimates on eligibility at introduction
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to be significant and positive.
In Table 5.4, I replicate the baseline regression with cohort bandwidth (-5, 5) and find no
significant results on any outcome of interest. This provides further evidence that results in
the baseline model are not driven by any long-term trend and, instead, represent the effect
of a one-time policy shock.
(c) Determining NCSE Introduction Date
There remains a possibility that the staggered implementation of NCSE at the province level
is not random. The timing of NCSE introduction might be determined by some province-level
characteristics, which in turn could influence individual respondents’ perception of upward
mobility. This is particularly plausible with the macroeconomic conditions in a province,
which could simultaneously influence its government’s decision to adopt NCSE and affect
its residents’ evaluation of their mobility. Similarly, the size of government, measured by its
fiscal revenue and expenditure, could influence both the timing of NCSE introduction and
individuals’ mobility perception and attitude.
To address this question, I employ two approaches to estimate any possible effects of
provincial-level determinants on the timing of NCSE introduction. First, I use a cross-
sectional dataset of province characteristics in 1999 to predict the timing of NCSE intro-
duction in each province;6 second, I use a panel data set of province×year observations to
determine if province characteristics in a given year predict NCSE introduction in the next
year. I estimate both an ordinary least squares (OLS) model and a Cox proportional hazard
model with each approach.
As shown in Table 5.5, the indicators of province characteristics are either insignificant or
inconsistent at predicting the timing of NCSE introduction. Neither the size of the economy,
the size of the government, or the employment rate is predictive. The level of economic
6The year 1999 is chosen because the first province to introduce NCSE did so in 1999. Using province
characteristics from other yeas between 1999 and 2009 does not change the regression results significantly.
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development in 1999, measured by 1999 GDP per capita in each province, yields statistically
significant coefficient estimates; three out of four coefficient estimates (columns (2)-(4))
indicate that higher per capita income in a province is associated with earlier introduction
of NCSE. I take this factor into account when estimating alternative model specifications
next (Table 5.6, Panel D).
(d) Alternative Model Specifications
Last but not least, to explore the robustness of the baseline results, I estimate additional
model specifications and report the coefficient estimates on eligibility at introduction in
Table 5.6, where the five columns have the same predictor variable(s) and the same outcome
variable as the five columns in Table 5.2, respectively. For each specification, I estimate the
regressions first using the full sample, then using smaller samples with 20 and 10 age cohorts,
respectively.
Panel A of Table 5.6 presents the baseline estimates using a parsimonious specification
that includes only province and cohort fixed effects, as well as survey year fixed effects. I
first cluster the standard errors at the province×cohort level and report the corresponding
p-values in brackets in the first row immediately below the coefficient values. I then cluster
the standard errors at the province level. Given that the number of province-level clusters
is small, I implement the wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2008)
and report the corresponding p-values in brackets in the second row after coefficient valuies.
Comparing the p-values, we see that changing the level of clustering does not affect our
statistical inferences.
To address the concern that NCSE introduction might have coincided with variation in
province characteristics that could affect respondent attitudes at the province×cohort level,
I control for the five province-level variables listed in Table 5.5 at the province×cohort level
in the regressions. As reported in Panel B, the estimated effects of eligibility at introduction
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on outcomes of interest are nearly identical to the baseline estimates.
Panel C reports coefficient estimates when controlling for individual-level characteris-
tics, including gender, ethnicity, hukou status, CCP membership, civil servant, and parent
in CCP. By doing so, I address any remaining concern with the imbalance of respondent
characteristics between control and treatment groups, especially when using the full sample.
The coefficient estimates are largely consistent with that of the baseline, with those on re-
distribution preference being slightly less robust. Moreover, by controlling for the dummy
variable, civil servant, I make sure that the significant positive effect of NCSE on mobility
experience is not driven only by those who succeeded in the exam and subsequently became
civil servants.
Lastly, based on the analysis in Table 5.5, we see that province-level GDP per capita in
1999 is somewhat predictive of the timing of NCSE introduction, which may in turn affect
the attitude of respondents from particular cohorts. In Panel D, I estimate the model while
controlling for the interaction between a province’s 1999 GDP per capital interacted with
cohort fixed effects. Again, the coefficient estimates are nearly identical with that of the
baseline.
In sum, the alternative model specifications produce coefficient estimates on eligibility at
introduction that are highly consistent with those from the baseline and further corroborates
the main findings.
4. Exploring Causal Mechanism
The data analysis in this chapter so far provides clear evidence that NCSE has a positive
effect on perception of upward mobility among college-educated individuals: the opportunity
of becoming regime insiders makes them more optimistic about their upward mobility and
less demanding with income redistribution.
The analysis, however, does not shed much light on the mechanism through which NCSE
125
influences individual perception and attitude, due to lack of relevant information in the
CGSS data. My theoretical argument assumes that merit-based elite recruitment makes
more people believe that they can now pursue a career in government regardless of personal
background. Is this assumption true? Does NCSE enhance perception of upward mobility
because its merit-based selection makes more college-educated youths view civil service as a
viable career choice, which was previously closed off to the vast majority who did not have
the necessary political connections? In other words, does NCSE affect their career preference
vis-a`-vis civil service?
To bridge this gap in the argument, I resort to a different set of survey data and present
evidence on how NCSE influences college-educated youths’ perception of upward mobility.
Data & Empirical Strategy
I draw on data from the Beijing College Panel Survey (BCPS). The 2009 wave of BCPS,
the only wave that is currently available, interviewed 4,752 college students enrolled in 15
universities in China’s capital, Beijing. Using a multi-stage, stratified probability propor-
tional to size (PPS) method, the survey drew a random sample of college students based on
Beijing Municipal Government’s Students Registration Database. All questionnaires were
distributed by the universities and self-administered by respondents. The absence of an
interviewer during the survey helped reduce respondents’ concerns about social desirability.
Using the BCPS data, I examine whether students from provinces where NCSE has
been implemented for a longer period of time have a stronger preference for civil service
as their future career. As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutionalization of meritocracy in
NCSE was a gradual process; the length of NCSE implementation in a province can thus be
viewed as a rough proxy for the degree of meritocracy in elite recruitment and its robustness
as a channel of upward mobility for college-educated citizens. Based on the timetable of
province-level NCSE introduction (see Figure 5.1), I generate a continuous variable for each
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respondent, years of NCSE implementation, calculated as the number of years lapsed since
NCSE introduction in his or her province until 2009 when the survey was conducted.
The outcome of interest is college students’ career preference, which is measured by two
questions in the survey. The first asks what type of organization a student most wants to
work for after graduation; one of the choices is “CCP and government organizations The
second asks what type of job a student considers most desirable after graduation; one of the
choices is “civil servant”.7 I construct two dichotomous variables, government organization
and civil service, based on these two questions, respectively, where respondents who chose
“CCP and government organizations” and “civil servant” are coded as 1 and the others as
0. These two dichotomous variables are the dependent variables, measuring students’ career
preference vis-a`-vis working in the government.
Using a logit regression, I estimate the following model,
Yip = α + βNCSEp + ΣδXi + ΣγZp + i (5.2)
where Yip represents the career choice of respondent i from province p, NCSEp measures the
number of years NCSE had been implemented in province p. The model controls for both
individual- and province-level covariates that could influence a respondent’s career prefer-
ence: Xi represents a set of individual-level characteristics of respondent i, including gender,
ethnicity, CCP membership, score in college entrance exam, academic standing in current
university, hours spent on extra-curricular, having parent(s) working in the government,
size of home city, academic major, class cohort, and type of university; Zp represents a set
of province-level characteristics where a respondent comes from, including GDP, GDP per
capita, fiscal revenue, fiscal expenditure, FDI inflow, population, and employment rate.8
7See Table 5.7 for more details.
8GDP and GDP per capita are included to account for level of economic development in a province,
which can influence the availability of other upward mobility opportunities. Fiscal revenue and expenditure
are included to account for size of the government sector in a province, which may be associated with the
appeal of civil service as a career choice. FDI inflow is included to account for presence of foreign invested
business in a province, which is the most popular career choice among respondents (see Table 5.7).
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Table 5.8 reports the descriptive statistics on respondent characteristics.
NCSE & Career Preference
Figure 5.3 reports the coefficient estimates of years of NCSE implementation on respon-
dents’ preference for working for the government. The left panel plots the estimates for the
dependent variable government organization, and the right panel plots the estimates for the
dependent variable civil servant. In each panel, the regression used in the first column con-
trols for current-year province-level characteristics, and the regression in the second column
controls for province-level characteristics with a one-year lag.





















current year 1−year lag
preferred job:
 civil servant
Note: This figure reports the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for years of
NCSE implementation on students’ career preference regarding government organization and civil
servant, respectively. Each panel reports two estimates using different model specifications; all
regressions control for both respondent-level and provincial-level characteristics, with standard
errors clustered at the level of student’s home city. Full results are reported in Table 5.9.
As shown, for both outcomes, whether using current-year province-level characteristics
or with a one-year lag, the coefficient estimates of years of NCSE implementation are consis-
tently significant and positive. With each additional year of NCSE implementation in their
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home province, college students’ preference for working in government increases by roughly
10%. It suggests that, the more established NCSE is as an open merit-based recruitment
system, the more attractive it becomes among college-educated youths, as they recognize
that NCSE is a viable path to advance their socioeconomic wellbeing.
This finding demonstrate that NCSE is increasingly viewed as a viable channel of upward
mobility as it becomes more institutionalized and more meritocratic. It attracts more college-
educated youths to consider civil service as their preferred career choice, which contributes
to their enhanced perception of upward mobility.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I examine the impact of NCSE on college-educated youths in China, who
constitute an increasingly large segment of the population. Applying a generalized difference-
in-differences framework to a national survey dataset, I estimate the effect of NCSE intro-
duction on those who happened to be eligible to take advantage of the open, merit-based
recruitment system. I find that NCSE introduction significantly enhances eligible individu-
als’ perception of their upward mobility, both in retrospect and in prospect; it also reduces
their preference for redistribution, which means they are more contented with the status
quo income distribution. Further, I explore the causal mechanism through which NCSE
enhances eligible individuals’ perception of upward mobility. I find that more robust NCSE
implementation is associated with greater career preference for civil service, indicating that,
as NCSE becomes more open, transparent, and merit-based, more people view it as a viable
channel of upward mobility.
With the aid of the empirical tests, I demonstrate that NCSE has far-reaching implica-
tions beyond just the few who succeed in the exam and become regime insiders. By allowing
all college-educated youths to apply and compete for government positions based on their
talent and effort, NCSE in effect co-opts them with upward mobility opportunities. Without
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making significant payouts, CCP is able to appease a large group, who are otherwise highly
capable of opposition and revolt, and strengthen regime stability.
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Appendix
Table 5.3: Balance of Respondent Characteristics
eligible=0 eligible=1 unconditional conditional
mean mean difference p-value difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. full sample
male 0.624 0.496 -0.127 0.000 -0.104 0.005
Han ethnic 0.926 0.934 0.007 0.445 0.010 0.516
urban 0.961 0.851 -0.110 0.000 -0.069 0.000
CCP member 0.445 0.221 -0.224 0.000 -0.188 0.000
civil servant 0.137 0.066 -0.071 0.000 -0.053 0.015
parent in CCP 0.380 0.313 -0.067 0.000 0.021 0.508
no. of observations 856 3,739
B. cohort bandwidth=(-10, 10)
male 0.626 0.513 -0.113 0.000 -0.094 0.011
Han ethnic 0.936 0.929 -0.007 0.550 0.006 0.712
urban 0.958 0.929 -0.030 0.010 -0.048 0.010
CCP member 0.413 0.326 -0.087 0.000 -0.170 0.000
civil servant 0.146 0.106 -0.040 0.010 -0.043 0.063
parent in CCP 0.383 0.395 0.012 0.622 0.010 0.782
no. of observations 671 1,219
C. cohort bandwidth=(-5, 5)
male 0.617 0.537 -0.079 0.012 -0.095 0.020
Han ethnic 0.940 0.924 -0.016 0.316 0.013 0.410
urban 0.956 0.932 -0.024 0.109 -0.043 0.054
CCP member 0.397 0.366 -0.032 0.307 -0.102 0.010
civil servant 0.150 0.116 -0.034 0.113 -0.024 0.359
parent in CCP 0.374 0.409 0.035 0.262 0.063 0.109
no. of observations 433 577
Note: This table reports summary statistics of respondent characteristics by their NCSE eligibility at the
time of introduction. Columns (1) and (2) report the means for the eligible group and the ineligible group,
respectively; columns (3) and (4) report the raw differences in means and the p-value for a t-test of differences
in means; columns (5) and (6) report differences in means conditional on cohort and province fixed effects.
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Table 5.4: Placebo Test of Baseline Model
mobility mobility redistribution
experience prospect preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. NCSE Implemented 5 Years Earlier
eligibility at introduction 0.088 0.112 0.112 0.204 0.204
(0.136) (0.178) (0.178) (0.130) (0.130)
current eligibility 0 0
(.) (.)
observations 638 267 267 353 353
B. NCSE Implemented 5 Years Later
eligibility at introduction 0.037 0.200∗∗ 0.110 0.055 0.073
(0.094) (0.096) (0.105) (0.095) (0.101)
current eligibility 0.268∗∗ -0.050
(0.142) (0.144)
observations 1274 1206 1206 745 745
Note: All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects (not reported), as well
as survey year fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
at the province×cohort level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.5: Predicting the Timing of Province-Level NCSE Introduction
Year of Introduction Post NCSE
Cross Section Panel
Measured in 1999 Lagged by 1 Year
OLS Cox Model OLS Cox Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Province Characteristics
GDP -.191 1.18 0.310∗∗ 1.50∗
( .294) (0.303) (.147) (0.333)
GDP per capita -1.36∗∗ 2.45∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗
(.670) ( 1.03) (0.116) ( 1.11)
total fiscal revenue -0.224 1.21 .164∗ 1.61∗∗
( .297) (.328) (0.085 ) (0.369)
total fiscal expenditure -0.054 1.12 0.233∗ 1.60
(0.379) (0.353) (0.123) (0.525)
employment rate -0.036 1.02 0.243 9.36
(.088) (.039) (0.493) (30.1)
Note: This table reports regression results on whether province-level characteristics have
any predictive power on the timing of NCSE introduction in each province. Regressions
in columns (1) and (2) use cross-sectional data of province-level characteristics at the
1999 level, which was the first year any province introduced NCSE; regressions in columns
(3) and (4) use panel data of province-level characteristics with a one-year lag. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.6: Robustness of Baseline Regressions
mobility mobility redistribution
coefficient on experience prospect preference
eligibility at introduction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Baseline
full sample 0.287∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗ -0.186∗
p-value [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.042] [0.055]
Wild bootstrap p-value [0.010] [0.002] [0.032] [0.027] [0.044]
bandwidth=(-10, 10) 0.305∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ -0.171∗ -0.168
p-value [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.091] [0.104]
Wild bootstrap p-value [0.010] [0.002] [0.020] [0.078] [0.088]
bandwidth=(-5, 5) 0.248∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.220∗ -0.199∗ -0.209∗
p-value [0.024] [0.045] [0.061] [0.082] [0.076]
Wild bootstrap p-value [0.072] [0.086] [0.148] [0.080] [0.076]
B: With Province×Cohort-Level Controls
full sample 0.281∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -0.196∗∗
(0.089) (0.100) (0.101) (0.096) (0.097)
bandwidth=(-10, 10) 0.321∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ -0.173∗ -0.173∗
(0.092) (0.098) (0.100) (0.102) (0.104)
bandwidth=(-5, 5) 0.272∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.240∗∗ -0.209∗ -0.219∗
(0.109) (0.123) (0.119) (0.115) (0.118)
C: With Individual-Level Controls
full sample 0.320∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ -0.166∗ -0.160∗
(0.089) (0.104) (0.103) (0.096) (0.097)
bandwidth=(-10, 10) 0.350∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ -0.151 -0.147
(0.092) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103)
bandwidth=(-5, 5) 0.284∗∗∗ 0.223∗ 0.201∗ -0.172 -0.187
(0.109) (0.126) (0.120) (0.111) (0.114)
D: Controlling for Provincial Economy×Cohort Fixed Effects
full sample 0.242∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗ -0.206∗∗
(0.091) (0.103) (0.103) (0.096) (0.097)
bandwidth=(-10, 10) 0.282∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ -0.198∗ -0.200∗∗
(0.094) (0.100) (0.101) (0.103) (0.106)
bandwidth=(-5, 5) 0.227∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.235∗ -0.220∗ -0.239∗
(0.114) (0.127) (0.123) (0.119) (0.123)
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates on eligibility at introduction; standard errors shown in parentheses
are clustered at the province×cohort level. All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects, as
well as survey year fixed effects.
Panel A reports the coefficient values from baseline regressions with two rows of p-values shown in brackets,
the first for standard errors clustered at the province×cohort level and the second for standard errors clustered
at the province level, where wild bootstrap is implemented. Panel B controls for GDP, GDP per capita, total
fiscal revenue, total fiscal expenditure, and employment rate at the province×cohort level. Panel C controls for
respondent characteristics including gender, ethnicity, hukou status, CCP member, civil servant, and parent in
CCP. Panel D includes an interaction between a province’s GDP per capita in 1999 and a full set of cohort fixed
effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.7: College Students’ Career Preference
Question 1: What type of organization do you most want to work for after graduation?
Frequency Percent
Foreign Invested Enterprises 1,583 33.55
Large State-Owned Enterprises 711 15.07
CCP and Government Organizations 486 10.3
Research Institutes 421 8.92
Other State-Owned or Collective Enterprises 385 8.16
Schools 355 7.52
Start-Ups 314 6.65
Public Institutions 253 5.36




Question 2: What kind of job do you consider most desirable after graduation?
Frequency Percent
Corporate Manager 1,315 27.87
Researcher 736 15.6
Skilled Professional (Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, etc.) 686 14.54
Civil Servant 604 12.8









Table 5.8: BCPS Data: Respondent Characteristics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
years of NCSE implementation 4,332 5.787 1.939 0 10
Career Preference
government organization 4,718 0.103 0.304 0 1
civil servant 4,718 0.128 0.334 0 1
Respondent Characteristics
male 4,718 0.526 0.499 0 1
Han ethnic 4,718 0.885 0.319 0 1
CCP membership 4,718 0.154 0.361 0 1
gaokao score 4,463 580.0 76.20 35 886
academic standing 4,718 5.259 2.462 0 9
extra-curricular hours 4,710 3.730 6.269 0 90
parent in government 4,718 0.184 0.388 0 1
size of home city 4,716 1.676 1.127 0 3
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Table 5.9: NCSE and College Student Career Preference
government organization civil servant
current year 1-year lag current year 1-year lag
(1) (2) (3) (4)
years of NCSE implementation 0.099∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039)
Student Characteristics
male 0.095 0.095 -0.181∗ -0.180∗
(0.111) (0.111) (0.094) (0.094)
Han ethnic -0.540∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.388∗∗
(0.160) (0.160) (0.171) (0.171)
CCP member 0.585∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.166) (0.118) (0.118)
gaokao score -0.001 -0.0011 -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
academic standing -0.047∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
extra-curricular hours 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
parent in government 0.868∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.184) (0.194) (0.194)
size of home city -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.050) (0.050)
Province Characteristics
GDP -1.944 -3.905 22.03 17.86
(18.04) (16.14) (17.13) (15.85)
GDP per capita 2.377 4.267 -21.49 -17.47
(17.94) (16.00) (17.09) (15.74)
fiscal revenue -0.526 -0.522 -0.150 0.057
(0.547) (0.578) (0.467) (0.481)
fiscal expenditure 0.488 0.415 0.708 0.398
(0.653) (0.651) (0.551) (0.532)
FDI inflow -0.018 0.015 -0.121 -0.131
(0.115) (0.121) (0.111) (0.124)
population 2.223 4.185 -22.12 -17.91
(18.23) (16.28) (17.35) (16.03)
employ rate -0.670 -0.584 -0.143 -0.274
(0.935) (1.068) (0.893) (1.008)
constant -25.11 -42.34 195.1 159.2
(165.5) (147.8) (157.5) (145.2)
observations 4102 4102 4102 4102
Note: This table reports logistic regression results using the 2009 BCPS data. All regressions include fixed effects
for students’ class cohort, academic major, and college type; standard errors clustered at the level of students’
home city are shown in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) include indicators of province characteristics of the
current year, whereas columns (2) and (4) include province characteristics with a one-year lag.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 6
Institutionalized Meritocracy and Regime Legitimacy
As evidenced in Chapter 5, the inclusive nature and merit-based selection process of NCSE
has fostered a perception of upward mobility among the citizens who are eligible to exam
the exam. When given an opportunity to rise into the political elite class, albeit on a highly
competitive basis, individuals demand less income redistribution from the government and
are less discontented with their current socioeconomic status. The change in perception and
attitude among college-educated youths, as brought about by NCSE, is crucial to long-term
stability of the CCP regime.
The impact of NCSE, however, is even more far-reaching and goes beyond the group
who stand to directly benefit from the upward mobility opportunity. By making the process
open, transparent, and rule-based, NCSE brings a kind of procedural justice that is not
often found in the political system. Although merit-based selection still favors those with
privileges (since as they can take, or have taken, advantage of superior education resources
and are hence better prepared for the exam), NCSE represents a rational system that is no
longer arbitrary or surrounded by secrecy. For non-elites in China, now there is at least a
road map that shows how an individual can rise into the political elite class. Thus, NCSE
serves as an institutionalized channel that connects ordinary citizens to the elites and reduces
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their sense of alienation in the regime.
In this chapter, I turn away from college-educated youths and look at the general public
instead. I examine their support for NCSE and its sources. In addition, I explore the
implications of NCSE support for regime legitimacy.
1. Support for Merit-Based Elite Recruitment
Data
To acquire a comprehensive understanding of the general public’s attitude towards NCSE, I
conducted a national representative survey in 2014 in collaboration with the Research Center
on Contemporary China (RCCC) in Peking University. Using a multi-level stratified sample,
the survey returned 4128 valid responses from both urban and rural areas in 25 provinces.
My main objective in the survey is to learn about whether, and how much, Chinese
citizens support NCSE as well as the reasons behind their support. To achieve this goal, I
designed a battery of questions specifically devoted to the topic of support for NCSE. The
main question is phrased as follows,
Question: The National Civil Service Exam has attracted a lot of attention in
recent years. According to the Civil Service Law, individuals must take NCSE
to enter the civil service. Do you support the institution of civil service exam?
Respondents were given choices on a scale of 1 to 5, indicating their level of support. Fol-
lowing the main question, respondents were asked to elaborate on their reasons for support,
Question: Based on your personal experience and observation, how much does
each of the descriptions below constitutes a reason for supporting NCSE? Please
indicate your level of agreement with each statement, on a level of 1 to 5.
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1. NCSE improves the administrative efficiency of the government by raising
the overall standard of civil service;
2. NCSE enhances the policymaking capacity of the government by strengthen-
ing technical expertise in the civil service;
3. NCSE provides a unobstructed channel of upward mobility for young talents,
regardless of their family background;
4. NCSE reduces corruption in the government by improving the moral stan-
dard of the civil service.
Table 6.1: NCSE Survey 2014: Respondent Support for NCSE
N Mean S.D. Min Max
overall support 3,326 3.997 0.786 1 5
reason for support
efficiency 3,394 4.017 0.837 1 5
policymaking 3,375 4.018 0.843 1 5
upward mobility 3,400 4.007 0.871 1 5
reduced corruption 3,382 3.907 0.943 1 5
As reported in Table 6.1, NCSE enjoys overwhelming support from the general public,
with an average score of roughly 4 out of 5. The four statements on reason for support also
receive similar level of support.
The survey also asked respondents whether they had personally taken NCSE and subse-
quently succeeded in placing themselves into the civil service. Since only a small proportion
of the respondents were eligible (i.e., meeting both the age and education requirements),
only 245 respondents in the sample reported that they had taken the exam before; among
them, 83 were successful and subsequently became civil servants. Using these questions, I
generated two dummy variables, “succeeded in NCSE” and “failed in NCSE”, indicating
different types of respondent experience with NCSE.
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In addition, the survey also collected demographic information on respondents, including
gender, age, education, city of residence, etc., as well as their family background such as
father’s political affiliation and father’s occupation. Table 6.6 in the Appendix reports the
summary statistics.
Analysis
In my analysis, I am mainly interested in two outcomes: an individual’s overall support for
NCSE and support for NCSE due to the upward mobility it provides. To understand what
factors influence these outcomes, I use an ordinary least-square (OLS) regression to estimate
the following model,
Yi = α + β Exam Experiencei + ΣδXi + i (6.1)
where Yi represents respondent i’s support for NCSE; Exam Experiencei includes two vari-
ables indicating respondent i’s experience with NCSE, i.e., “succeeded in NCSE” and “failed
in NCSE”; Xi represents a set of individual-level characteristics of respondent i, including
gender, age, ethnicity, education, CCP membership, type of residence (urban vs. rural),
father’s CCP membership, and father’s occupation type.1
As discussed in Chapter 5, the introduction of NCSE was staggered across provinces.
Consequently, respondents’ awareness of and familiarity with NCSE would vary across
provinces. Also, because the institutionalization of NCSE was a gradual process, the length
of NCSE implementation in a province serves as a proxy for the degree of meritocracy in its
elite recruitment. For these reasons, I expect respondents from provinces with a longer his-
tory of NCSE implementation to exhibit higher level of support. Therefore, I also estimate
the following model with an OLS regression,
1Respondent’s father’s occupation is measured by a dummy variable, “father in working class,” which
takes value 1 when the respondent’s father is/was a farmer or ordinary worker, and takes value 0 otherwise.
This variable measures whether a respondent comes from a relatively disadvantaged background.
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Yip = α + β Exam Experiencei + γ NCSEp + ΣδXi + i (6.2)
where Yip on the left of the equal sign represents the level of support for NCSE by respondent
i from province p. On the right hand side, the model is largely the same as the one above,
except that it includes an additional predictor, NCSEp, which measures the number of years
that NCSE has been implemented in province p.
The regression results for both models are reported in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, respec-
tively. In Table 6.2, we see that, not surprisingly, successful personal experience in NCSE
boosts one’s support for the recruitment system. However, interestingly, experience of failure
in NCSE – when compared to not having taken it at all – does not make one less supportive
of the system; and this is true for both overall level of support (columns 1-3) and support
due to upward mobility (columns 4-6). This finding is important, since the vast majority
of NCSE applicants do not succeed, and it is crucial for the CCP regime that they do not
become disillusioned or cynical. One possible explanation for their consistent support is that
the transparent selection process in NCSE leaves little room for them to blame the system.
Although this is only a conjecture, if true, it speaks to the procedural justice that NCSE
brings.
Table 6.2 also offers another insight, which is that both respondents from political elite
family background (indicated by having a “father in CCP”) and respondents from under-
privileged family background (indicated by having a “father in working class”) exhibit higher
level of support for NCSE, both overall and for the reason of upward mobility. It suggests
that public support for NCSE is not driven by one end of the socioeconomic spectrum. It is
especially important to the regime that individuals from humble origins support NCSE and
they believe that the upward mobility channel is working for them.
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Table 6.2: Individual-Level Determinants for NCSE Support
support: overall support: upward mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
succeeded in NCSE 0.381∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.088) (0.090) (0.089)
failed in NCSE 0.061 0.130∗ 0.034 0.093
(0.080) (0.077) (0.082) (0.079)
male -0.083∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
age 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Han ethnic 0.069 0.064 0.043 0.038
(0.073) (0.073) (0.081) (0.082)
college -0.004 -0.032 0.019 -0.004
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042)
CCP 0.102∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035)
urban -0.003 -0.006 -0.020 -0.023
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
father in CCP 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045)
father in working class 0.078∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
constant 3.985∗∗∗ 3.660∗∗∗ 3.662∗∗∗ 3.997∗∗∗ 3.660∗∗∗ 3.663∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.095) (0.096) (0.033) (0.101) (0.101)
observations 3326 3326 3326 3400 3400 3400
Note: This table reports OLS regression results using the 2014 NCSE survey data. The dependent
variable in columns (1)-(3) is respondents’ overall level of support for NCSE; the dependent variable in
columns (4)-(6) is respondents’ level of support for NCSE for the upward mobility it provides. Standard
errors are clustered at the city level for all regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.3: Effect of NCSE Implementation on NCSE Support
support: overall support: upward mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
years of NCSE implementation 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.038∗ 0.030∗ 0.030∗ 0.029∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
succeeded in NCSE 0.331∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.084) (0.085) (0.090)
failed in NCSE 0.062 0.137 0.046 0.113













father in CCP 0.106∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.048)
father in working class 0.068∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.034) (0.036)
constant 3.593∗∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 3.695∗∗∗ 3.689∗∗∗ 3.393∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.210) (0.227) (0.180) (0.180) (0.203)
observations 3101 3101 3101 3172 3172 3172
Note: This table reports OLS regression results using the 2014 NCSE survey data. The independent variable
“years of NCSE implementation” is at the province level, the other variables are at the individual level. The
dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is respondents’ overall level of support for NCSE; the dependent
variable in columns (4)-(6) is respondents’ level of support for NCSE for the upward mobility it provides.
Standard errors are clustered at the city level for all regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Results in Table 6.3 show that the individual-level determinants for NCSE support con-
tinue to be robust when we add in the higher-level variable. As expected, respondents’
support for NCSE increases with “years of NCSE implementation,” indicating that as the
merit-based elite recruitment system continues to mature and becomes more institutional-
ized, it enjoys more and more public support. One reason for the growing support is the
popular belief that NCSE provides upward mobility for youths regardless of their family
background (columns 4-6), and this belief seems to be enforced over time.
I replicate the two regression models with the other three reasons for NCSE support,
namely efficiency, policymaking, and anti-corruption (see Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 in the
Appendix). While the coefficient estimates for “succeeded in NCSE” and “years of NCSE
implementation” continue to be significant and positive, the effects of “father in working
class” disappear. Taken all results together, we can infer that the upward mobility provided
by NCSE is particularly important in generating support among those from underprivileged
background.
2. NCSE: A Source of Regime Legitimacy
When considered in isolation, public support for NCSE can seem trivial, since its merito-
cratic nature almost automatically invokes approval. However, as an increasingly well-known
political institution that serves as a bridge connecting ordinary citizens and the political elite
and that many citizens can take part in, NCSE has important implications for the legitimacy
of the CCP regime.
Due to the centralized rule by CCP and the absence of elections, most Chinese citizens
seldom have a chance to participate in politics or even come into contact with the govern-
ment in a regular, institutional setting. As NCSE continues to draw millions of applicants
every year, it becomes a rare window through which ordinary citizens catch a glimpse of
how their local governments function and even interact with government officials. If the
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recruitment process is transparent, open, and just, it demonstrates to the public that the
CCP government is fair-minded and credible when dealing with ordinary citizens. This, in
turn, contributes to the legitimacy of its rule.
The survey I conducted in 2014 provides some corroborating evidence. In addition to
questions on support for NCSE, it also included a series of questions on respondents’ support
for other political institutions. Specifically, it asked respondents to rate their level of support,
on a scale of 1 to 5, for the local government, local court, local People’s Congress, local CCP
branch, and local procuratorate. Figure 6.1 below shows the average support for NCSE
and that for local political institutions. Since most Chinese citizens experience and observe
NCSE at the local level, the comparison between NCSE and other local political institutions
is warranted.







1 2 3 4 5
level of support
Note: This plot reports the average level of public support for various political institu-
tions at the prefectural level (i.e., cities and municipalities). Horizontal bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, Not only does NCSE enjoy high level of public support (i.e.,
4.00 out of 5), its support level is significantly higher than all other local political institutions,
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including the government and the CCP. This is noteworthy, as respondents often suffer from
pressure of social desirability when asked about support for government and CCP and tend
to inflate their answers, which means the gap between support for NCSE and that for local
government and CCP could be even larger in reality. For the ruling party that depends
heavily on performance legitimacy, NCSE has become a important source of that legitimacy,
especially when other political institutions do not perform nearly as well in the eyes of the
public.
To further investigate whether, and how, NCSE contributes to the legitimacy of the CCP,
I look at several opinion questions in the survey concerning respondents’ attitude towards
the regime. Two questions asked respondents how satisfied they were with the government
at the central and local level, respectively, on a scale of 0 to 10; another question asked if
respondents agreed, on a scale of 1 to 4, with the statement that, ”People should support our
current political system despite the various problems it has.” Table 6.4 reports the summary
statistics of the responses to these questions.
Table 6.4: NCSE Survey 2014: Respondent Attitude on Political Legitimacy
N Mean S.D. Min Max
satisfaction with central government 3,998 7.581 2.007 0 10
satisfaction with local government 3,919 6.511 2.364 0 10
support for current political system 3,611 2.780 0.724 1 4
Next, I examine whether political support for the regime varies with NCSE. Once again, I
use the province-level variable, “years of NCSE implementation,” as a proxy for the degree of
meritocracy and institutionalization in elite recruitment, and run a simple OLS model with
it as the main predictor. Since it is beyond individual respondents’ control as how many
years NCSE has been implemented in their province, the coefficient estimates, if statistically
significantly, can be interpreted as having a causal effect.
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Table 6.5: Effect of NCSE Implementation on Political Legitimacy
satisfaction with government political system
central level local level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
years of NCSE implementation 0.030 0.019 0.179∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.053) (0.050) (0.083) (0.080) (0.013) (0.012)
succeeded in NCSE 0.038 0.372 -0.022
(0.253) (0.331) (0.102)
failed in NCSE -0.169 -0.294 -0.023
(0.184) (0.238) (0.072)
male -0.164∗∗ -0.205∗∗ -0.021
(0.070) (0.083) (0.029)
age 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Han ethnic -0.257 -0.344 -0.062
(0.242) (0.278) (0.074)
college 0.027 0.271∗ -0.008
(0.098) (0.148) (0.045)
CCP 0.113 0.055 0.002
(0.109) (0.127) (0.041)
urban 0.156∗ -0.014 0.030
(0.086) (0.150) (0.038)
father in CCP 0.182∗ -0.097 0.053
(0.101) (0.129) (0.039)
father in working class 0.267∗∗∗ 0.105 0.075∗∗
(0.096) (0.158) (0.036)
constant 7.284∗∗∗ 6.255∗∗∗ 4.610∗∗∗ 4.137∗∗∗ 2.486∗∗∗ 2.153∗∗∗
(0.539) (0.522) (0.835) (0.706) (0.130) (0.151)
observations 3614 3614 3539 3539 3259 3259
Note: This table reports OLS regression results using the 2014 NCSE survey data. The independent variable
“years of NCSE implementation” is at the province level, the other variables are at the individual level.
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is respondents’ satisfaction with the performance of central
government; the dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is respondents’ satisfaction with the performance of
their local government; and the dependent variable in columns (5)-(6) is respondents’ degree of agreement
with the statement that “People should support our current political system despite its various problems.”
Standard errors are clustered at the city level for all regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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For each outcome of interest, I estimate two model specifications, one with individual-
level covariates and the other one without. The results are reported in Table 6.5, and they
are consistent across different model specifications. For satisfaction with central government
(columns 1-2), the coefficient estimates on NCSE implementation are not statistically signif-
icant, indicating that NCSE does not affect how respondents view the central government.
In contrast, the coefficient estimates on NCSE implementation for satisfaction with local
government (columns 3-4) are positive and statistically significant, which suggest that, as
NCSE implementation deepens, respondents come to view their local governments more fa-
vorably. The non-effect on satisfaction with central government and the positive effect on
local government are illuminating. Because NCSE is implemented locally, the general public
tends to give local government credit as the selection process becomes more transparent and
fair. Moreover, NCSE implementation also has a positive effect on respondents’ support for
the current political system, despite the various problems it has (columns 5-6). This finding
echoes the attitude I frequently encountered during interviews on the topic of NCSE, which
is that, although the system is not perfect and there is significant corruption inside the gov-
ernment, at least now it gives ordinary citizens an opportunity to join the government and
potentially benefit from the system. In other words, NCSE makes non-elites more tolerant
of the problems the regime has. Alternatively, the positive effect of NCSE on support for
the current political system can be interpreted in conjunction with its positive effect on local
governments. Since Chinese citizens are likely to accord legitimacy to the regime based on
its performance, as they become more satisfied with their local governments (as a result of
NCSE implementation), their view on the political system would also improve.
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3. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I examine public support for NCSE and its implications for the legitimacy
of the regime. Using data from a national representative survey, I find that, while successful
experience with NCSE increases its support, failed experience does not diminish it. Imple-
mentation of NCSE, therefore, can only lead to a net gain of public support without the risk
of embittering failed applicants, who constitute the majority of people participating in the
exam. This would encourage the central government to continue promoting the exam and
its meritocratic nature. I also find that NCSE enjoys an increasing level of support as it has
been around for longer; it shows that, as the public learns more about NCSE , it grows to
like it more, quite possibly because of the open and transparent selection process.
Moreover, I also explore the effect of NCSE implementation on political legitimacy. I
find that NCSE serves as an important source of legitimacy for the regime; in particular, it
enhances public perception of local government and makes ordinary citizens more tolerant
of the existing political system.
One important implication of these findings is that, as NCSE becomes a source of le-
gitimacy that the CCP regime relies upon, it becomes harder for the regime to abolish the
merit-based elite recruitment system. In other words, although there is no hard constraint
on the CCP that prevents it from taking away merit-based elite recruitment at its will, the
political legitimacy NCSE helps to generate acts as a powerful incentive for the ruling party
to keep it. In other words, the fear of losing legitimacy serves as a commitment device. As
long as college-educated youths believe that NCSE is here to stay, their perception of upward
mobility will be enhanced and their demand for income distribution weakened. This, in turn,
contributes to regime stability.
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Appendix
Table 6.6: NCSE Survey 2014: Summary Statistics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
years of NCSE implementation 3,728 10.363 1.840 5 15
Individual Experience with NCSE
succeeded in NCSE 4,128 0.020 0.140 0 1
failed in NCSE 4,128 0.039 0.195 0 1
Respondent Characteristics
male 4,128 0.474 0.499 0 1
age 4,128 46.4 17.0 18 80
Han ethnic 4,128 0.965 0.185 0 1
college 4,128 0.278 0.448 0 1
CCP membership 4,128 0.160 0.366 0 1
urban 4,128 0.744 0.437 0 1
father in CCP 4,128 0.152 0.359 0 1












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































My dissertation is motivated by a fundamental question that, why does merit-based elite
recruitment exist in an authoritarian regime? When left to their own inclinations, authori-
tarian elites prefer to recruit and promote individuals based on patronage ties, as doing so
helps them extend their power sphere and also reduces potential threat coming from capable
outsiders. Why, then, would a regime like the CCP adopt a recruitment system that runs
counter to elite preference?
The central argument I make is that, by instituting a merit-based system for elite recruit-
ment, an authoritarian regime allows ordinary citizens to enter the elite class on the basis of
their talent and effort. In essence, merit-based elite recruitment provides a channel for non-
elites to move up the socioeconomic ladder within the existing political framework, as oppose
to pursuing other options (e.g., revolts and etc.) that threaten the stability or survival of the
regime. Even though the number of opportunities to move up are limited, when a regime
is committed to merit-based elite recruitment, it forges a belief that the channel to enter
the ruling elite class is open to all, regardless of background and status; in turn, it creates a
widespread and persistent perception of upward mobility among its ordinary citizens, which
makes them more optimistic about their future prospect and more tolerant of their current
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socioeconomic conditions.
Focusing on the Chinese case, in which the CCP introduced the National Civil Service
Examination (NCSE) about two decades ago, I empirically test my argument that insti-
tutionalized meritocracy generates perception of upward mobility, which helps to stabilize
the regime. To do so, I focus on two main areas, namely the dynamic between the central
government and local elites in the enforcement of meritocracy in NCSE, and the dynamic
between ordinary citizens and the ruling class as a result of NCSE introduction.
On the topic of enforcing meritocracy, I first examine incumbent elites’ preference during
recruitment (Chapter 3). I find that, as expected, local elites are motivated by private
interests to prefer candidates with patronage ties. This preference often interferes with the
meritocratic recruitment criteria set by the central government in NCSE. Next, I explore how
the central government addresses the problem of divergent elite preference (Chapter 4). I find
that, by imposing enforceable rules and constraints on local elites, their patronage behavior
during recruitment can be reigned in. As NCSE becomes more institutionalized (i.e., with
laws governing its implementation and a devoted government agency enforcing these laws),
elites learn to do away with patronage practice, which makes NCSE an increasingly level
playing field for all applicants, regardless their patronage ties.
Having shown that, through institutionalization, the regime can credibly demonstrate
its commitment to NCSE as a system of merit-based elite recruitment, I then explore what
impacts it has on ordinary Chinese citizens. In Chapter 5, I show that the introduction of
NCSE has made more college-educated youths consider civil service as a viable career choice,
as they are now able to compete based on merit and do not have to worry about their pa-
tronage ties or the lack thereof. The belief that NCSE is a open and viable channel to enter
the elite class, in turn, makes college-educated youths in China more optimistic about their
upward mobility in the regime and, correspondingly, less demanding on the government for
income redistribution. Taken together, these findings indicate that institutionalized meritoc-
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racy can serve as an instrument of co-optation that makes millions of capable young people
buy into the existing political arrangement and seek socioeconomic betterment via a channel
provided by the regime.
Last but not least, I examine the implications of NCSE on the legitimacy of the regime
(Chapter 6). I find that, although only a small portion of the population is eligible to
participate in the exam, NCSE receives overwhelming public support. Citizens are especially
fond of the idea that, as a open and transparent platform, NCSE provides an opportunity of
upward mobility for all young talents, regardless of their status or background. Compared
to other political institutions, NCSE is viewed much more favorably by the public and it has
become a source of legitimacy for the CCP regime.
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